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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation examines the validity of the Fisher hypothesis and the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis by using an approach which is different from those 
employed in the previous studies.  The importance of the hypotheses in the field of 
international economics is reflected by the ample volume of research work directed to 
them.  Nevertheless, the validity of the hypotheses remains controversial and the 
findings on the issues are diverse.  In light of this, I use a different empirical 
approach to examine the two hypotheses and hope that the findings here would bring 
new insight to the literature. 
 In the first chapter of my dissertation, I investigate whether the Fisher effect 
holds for the US.  The Fisher relationship maintains that nominal interest rates and 
expected inflation move in a one-to-one manner.  As conventional unit root tests find 
that both nominal interest rates and inflation are unit root processes, most recent 
papers have used a cointegration approach to verify if the fisher effect holds.  Given 
that US nominal interest rates and inflation fell and rose after reaching certain peaks 
and troughs over the last few decades, there is doubt in treating the time series as 
non-stationary.  I investigate the issue for the US using two different approaches.  
In the structural break analysis, I find that the direction and magnitude of breaks in 
nominal interest rate and inflation follow approximately to what the Fisher effect 
x 
predicts.  The stability of real interest rates provides further support for the validity 
of the Fisher link.  In the second part of the paper, I use a VAR model to examine the 
dynamic relationship between nominal rates and inflation.  As volatility clustering is 
present, I include a GARCH effect in the estimation.  The results show that nominal 
rates respond positively to a shock in inflation and the magnitude of cumulated 
response is only slightly below that predicted by the Fisher hypothesis.  The findings 
are strongly in favor of the presence of the Fisher effect. 
 The second chapter examines validity of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis 
(BSH) in a sample of nine OECD countries with the US taken as the benchmark.  
The BSH admits the importance of productivity in explaining the fluctuations of real 
exchange rates via its impact on the relative non-tradable prices.  The results from 
the structural break analysis indicate that four countries tie with the hypothesis while 
the other three countries are in partial fit.  Similar findings are obtained when 
government spending is considered in the estimations.  Examining the dynamic 
relationship among the variables by a VAR-GARCH model, the findings support a 
strong link between productivity shocks and real exchange rates.  The results are 
robust when the time series are either treated as I(0) or I(1).  The responses of 
relative prices to productivity shocks are in the expected directions, however, the sizes 
are mild in most cases.  In this regard, I examine an alternative transmission channel 
xi 
for productivity shocks.  The results suggest that the real exchange rate of tradable 
goods maybe an important channel through which productivity impacts on real 
exchange rates.  As a whole, the findings in this paper are slightly in favor of the 
hypothesis. 
 In the third chapter, I extend my study on the Fisher hypothesis to cover the same 
sample of nine OECD countries.  I employ a similar empirical approach as in the 
first chapter.  In the structural break analyses, I investigate if real interest rates are 
stable over the entire sample period.  Since the findings show that the real rates for 
most of these countries have experienced major shifts over time, I examine the 
reasons behind these changes by considering some possible factors suggested by the 
literature.  Employing VAR-GARCH models and innovation analyses, I find that 
nominal interest rates have limited response to inflation shock.  The failure of 
achieving the hypothesized one-to-one relationship is not due to an inappropriate tax 
adjustment of the nominal rates.  After considering the overall results, only two 
countries in the sample follow closely with the predictions from the Fisher hypothesis.  
While the evidence of three countries rejects the Fisherian link, the findings for the 
rest are mixed.  I suggest that the evidence for the Fisher hypothesis is weak. 
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Chapter 1 
The Fisher effect from different perspectives 
1.1  Introduction 
The Fisher effect was put forward by Fisher (1930).  It hypothesized that there 
is a one to one relationship between nominal interest rates and expected inflation 
provided that the real rate is held constant.  Since interest rates are key variables in 
macroeconomic modeling and policy formulation, the validity of the Fisher effect is 
crucial to both theoretical researchers and policymakers.  If there is evidence in favor 
of the Fisher hypothesis, it will also lend support to the monetary neutrality 
proposition which is one of the centerpieces in classical economics.  Due to its 
importance, there is a voluminous literature examining the Fisher effect.  However, 
the findings on whether the Fisherian link holds vary with the countries under 
investigation and empirical methods being used.  Early papers like Fama (1975) and 
Summers (1983) directly examined the relationship between nominal interest rates 
and inflation for the US by using least squares method.  With the advancement of 
empirical methods and findings that favors the existence of unit root behavior for 
nominal interest rates and inflation, most recent empirical studies have focused on 
examining the cointegration relationship between the variables.  However, this 
technique is appropriate only if both nominal interest rate and inflation are integrated 
2 
of the same order.  Over the last few decades, inflation and nominal interest rates fell 
and rose after reaching certain peaks and troughs.  There is doubt in treating the time 
series as a unit root process.  Furthermore, we expect policymakers of a mature 
economy to keep both inflation and nominal rates under control.  Hence, the 
appropriateness of employing the cointegration approach may not be appropriate. 
 In this paper, I will use two different methods to examine the relationship 
between the nominal interest rates and inflation for the US.  The first approach relies 
on estimating the structural the breaks of each univariate time series.  I compare the 
timing, direction and magnitude of breaks for nominal rate and inflation.  If the 
Fisher effect holds, there will be a close proximity of break time for each series.  
Furthermore, they will move in the same direction and be approximately the same size.  
The findings show that the timing of structural breaks does not match strictly.  The 
estimated break time for inflation generally precedes those of nominal rates.  On the 
direction and size of the shifts, the results fit quite well with the predictions from the 
Fisher equation.  The findings are almost the same when tax-adjusted nominal rates 
or unadjusted nominal rates are used for comparison. 
 Since the impact of inflation on nominal interest rates may not be 
contemporaneous, I formulate a VAR model to examine the relationship between the 
tax-adjusted nominal interest rates and inflation.  This second approach takes into 
3 
consideration the presence of dynamic effects and serves as a countercheck to the 
previous approach.  As opposed to some early studies using VAR models, I will take 
into account the existence of volatility clustering.  A GARCH effect is incorporated 
into the model and it becomes a VAR-GARCH setup.  To avoid unnecessary 
restrictions in the conditional variance-covariance structure, I will use a full BEKK 
model (Engle and Kroner 1995).  The result indicates that a positive shock to 
inflation does produce a significant positive effect on nominal interest rates in the 
impulse response analysis.  With respect to the magnitude of responses, a unit shock 
on inflation will produce an accumulated response of comparable sizes in both 
nominal rates and inflation.  Even though the size of responses does not match 
perfectly with the Fisher prediction, it is not far apart either.  The findings strongly 
favor the presence of the Fisher effect. 
 The subsequent sections will be organized as follows.  Section 2 is a brief 
literature review.  Section 3 describes the techniques used in estimating the structural 
breaks and the results will be presented.  Section 4 covers the details of 
VAR-GARCH model and the analysis of results.  The final section concludes the 
paper. 
1.2  Literature Review 
The relationship between inflation and nominal interest rates is an important 
4 
topic in international economics.  To explain the link between the two variables, 
different propositions have been suggested.  Under the liquidity effect, a positive 
money shock will push up in inflation and lower nominal interest rates so as to induce 
economic agents to hold additional real money balance.  On the other hand, the 
Fisher effect suggests that an increase in expected inflation will accompany with an 
increase in nominal interest rates in a one-to-one manner.  As a result, the real 
interest rate will be neutral to changes in inflation.  While the liquidity effect is 
believed to dominate in the short run, the long run impact of the Fisher effect is more 
controversial and will be the focus of this paper. 
Early studies like Fama (1975) and Summers (1983) examined the empirical 
relationship by treating nominal interest rates as a predictor of expected inflation 
using US data.  Fama found evidence in support of the Fisherian link for the US 
during the period from 1953 to 1971.  In contrast, Summers admitted the effect was 
smaller than that predicted by theory and all the power of the relationship comes 
solely from the period 1965 to 1971.  In the 1990s, much of the research effort has 
been focused on the cointegration relationship between nominal interest rates and 
inflation.  Following the seminal papers of Rose (1988) and Mishkin (1992), Evans 
and Lewis (1995) investigated the cointegration between nominal interest rates and 
inflation by applying the dynamic ordinary least square method (DOLS) to estimate 
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the effect of inflation on nominal interest rates.  They rejected the one to one 
adjustment as predicted by the Fisher effect.  In response, they modeled a Markov 
switching model to characterize the shifts in inflation.  They showed that if 
economic agents formed their expectation on inflation with consideration of the 
structural changes, the results from subsequent cointegration analysis would support 
the existence of the Fisher effect.  Crowder and Hoffman (1996) apply the Johansen 
(1988) method and vector error correction model (VECM) to investigate the link 
between tax-adjusted interest rates and inflation for the US from 1951 to 1991 using 
quarterly data.  They support the one to one adjustment as hypothesized by the 
Fisher effect.  Koustas and Serletis (1999) used post-war quarterly data for eleven 
countries.  Though they cannot reject the hypothesis of unit root processes, they find 
that cointegration does not exist.  They in turn adopt a VAR model in first 
differences and generally reject the Fisher hypothesis for these countries. 
There are a growing number of papers which questioned the appropriateness of 
using conventional cointegration method, for instance, Lanne (2001) and Atkins and 
Coe (2002).  They suggest that the nonstationarity of interest rates and inflation 
maybe a result of the low power of conventional unit root tests.  In response to the 
ambiguity on the stationarity of interest rates and inflation, these authors use empirical 
methods which do not require interest rates and inflation to be integrated of the same 
6 
order.  Lanne (2001) estimated an inflation forecasting equation using nominal rate 
as the independent variable.  He uses the Scheffe type confidence intervals of 
Cavanagh et al. (1995) for subsequent empirical testing.  The intuition is that these 
confidence intervals are asymptotically valid whether the regressor is integrated of 
order one, zero or is a near unit root process.  He finds that the Fisher effect holds in 
the US for the pre-1979 period but is absent afterwards.  Atkins and Coe (2002) test 
the Fisherian link for Canada and the US by the bounds test developed by Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (2001).  Their findings are in favor of the Fisherian view.  Casting 
doubt on the integratedness of inflation, Westerlund (2008) propose two new panel 
cointegration tests which are robust against the presence of stationary regressors.  He 
examines the Fisher effect by using a panel of twenty OECD countries from 1980 to 
2004.  He admits that the new tests considers cross-sectional data dependency and 
have higher power than the existing test like Pedroni (2004).  The findings suggest 
that the Fisher hypothesis cannot be rejected based on his panel studies.  
1.2.1  My Approach 
Most of the empirical studies have regarded nominal rates and inflation as unit 
root processes and have used the cointegration technique to examine their relationship.  
The use of the cointegration method is appropriate only if nominal interest rates and 
inflation are integrated of the same order.  Examining nominal interest rates and 
7 
inflation for the last few decades, the time series fell and rose within a certain range.  
This evidence indicates that the findings of nonstationarity for these time series are 
the results of the low power of conventional unit root tests.  Thus the cointegration 
approach is deemed inappropriate and the findings from this method may not reveal 
the true picture.  Furthermore, volatility clustering is a common feature found in 
most economic time series.  Studies based on the dynamic effect of nominal interest 
rates and inflation without accounting for conditional heteroskedasticity could be 
deficient.  Accordingly, I use the empirical approach as in Grier and Ye (2007) to 
examine the Fisher effect by estimating and comparing the structural breaks of each 
time series.  The timing and magnitude of breaks will provide evidence for whether 
the Fisher relationship holds.  Afterwards, I will formulate a VAR-GARCH model 
and will examine the dynamic effect by using impulse response analysis. 
1.3  Estimating Structural Breaks 
Empirical evidence of the Fisher hypothesis requires the existence of common 
structural breaks and a one-to-one co-movement for nominal interest rates and 
expected inflation across regimes.  In this section, I estimate and compare the 
structural breaks of inflation, tax-adjusted nominal interest rates and unadjusted 
nominal interest rates to see if the Fisher effect holds. 
 The dataset consists of quarterly observations from 1953 Q1 to 2008 Q1.  The 
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three-month US Treasury Bill rate is used to represent nominal interest rates.  The 
data is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  The inflation rate is 
the annualized, quarterly difference of the logarithm of CPI_U index (all urban) 
computed from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  To account for the Darby (1975) 
effect, tax-adjusted nominal interest rate is also computed.  My method of 
calculation follows Rapach and Wohar (2005) and Caporale and Grier (2005).  The 
US marginal tax rate is taken from Padovano and Galli (2001). 
 Structural breaks in the nominal interest rates and inflation are estimated by 
using Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) (hereafter BP).  The method enables the 
estimation of multiple structural breaks by using a global optimization approach.  
Here I use a pure structural break or a simple mean-shifting setup specified as below: 
 
t t j ty z uβ= +            (1) 
 
where ty  is the inflation rate or nominal interest rate and tz  is a constant equal to 
one.  jβ  is the estimated mean for the j
th regime.  If there are m  breaks in the 
time series, j equals 1, 2, … m, m+1.  Table 1 reports the estimated structural breaks 
for inflation rate using BP’s method1.  The results indicate that there are three 
structural breaks in inflation over the period.  The break dates are 1967 Q1, 1973 Q1 
                                                 
1 The maximum number of breaks are set to 7 with the trimming parameter equals 0.1.  Serial 
correlation , heterogeneous variance in residuals over different regimes are allowed. 
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and 1982 Q2 respectively.  These findings are consistent with those found in Rapach 
and Wohar (2004) and Caporale and Grier (2005). 
Table 2 and 3 show the results of break estimation for tax-adjusted nominal 
interest rate and unadjusted nominal interest rates.  The same BP parameter settings 
for estimating breaks in inflation are used.  The findings for adjusted and unadjusted 
interest rates are very similar.  In both cases, there are five breaks for the entire 
period.  The estimated break dates are almost identical. 
1.3.1  Comparing the Breaks in Nominal Interest Rate and Inflation 
An analysis of the Fisher effect necessitates the matching of the number of 
structural breaks in each time series and the size of mean-shift.  Figure 1 shows 
graphs for the structural breaks of nominal interest rates, tax-adjusted nominal interest 
rates and inflation.  At first glance, the results reported in Table 1 through 3 do not fit 
Fisher’s predictions very well.  There are only three breaks in inflation compared 
with the five breaks found in both interest rates.  In terms of timing of breaks, only 
the first break of inflation (67 Q1) and tax-adjusted interest rate (67 Q3) or unadjusted 
interest rate (65 Q3) are perceived to be common breaks.  For the others, the break 
dates found in inflation and interest rates are a distance apart even after considering 
the confidence intervals of the break dates2. 
                                                 
2 The third break in inflation and nominal interest rate is marginally non-overlapping for the 95% 
confidence interval 
10 
Since interest rate movements can be impacted by deliberate monetary policy by 
the Federal Reserve (Cook 1989, Taylor 1993 ), the deviations may reflect these 
policy actions.  If we relax the Fisher hypothesis and allow for some time lags for the 
interest rate responding to changes in inflation, the direction and size of shifts are very 
close to the Fisherian view. 
1.3.2  Matching of Break Date 
As mentioned in the previous section, the first break date for both interest rates 
and inflation happen almost simultaneously, these two breaks are perceived as 
co-movement in the series.  The second break for both the interest rate and inflation 
occurred in the 1970s and it was also the only break in that period.  If we allow for 
time lags in the break of interest rate, they are the second matched pair.  As 
explained, the third break for interest rates and inflation is very close when 
considering the confidence interval of break dates, they are treated as another 
co-movement. 
Table 4 indicates the mean-shifts in each regime for both interest rates and 
inflation.  Comparing the size of shifts, both the interest rate and the inflation rate 
reveal close mean-shifts as predicted by Fisher.  If we regard the fourth and fifth 
breaks in the nominal interest rate as belonging to part of the adjustment process after 
11 
the third break, the findings well support the Fisher relationship3. 
1.3.3  Analysis of the Real Interest Rate 
In the last section, the findings are in favor of the Fisher hypothesis at least in its 
weak form.  This result can be counterchecked by analyzing the real interest rate.  
Given the real interest rate as: 
e
t t tr i π= −        (2) 
where tr , ti  and 
e
tπ  are the real rate, nominal rate and expected inflation
4 
respectively.  From (2), if nominal interest rates and the inflation rate move in a 
one-to-one manner, the real interest rate should be quite stable.  Using this equation, 
the tax-adjusted real rate is computed.  Table 5 reports the estimated structural 
breaks of real rate using BP.  It indicates that there are three breaks found in 1972 Q4, 
1980 Q3 and 1986 Q1.  Figure 2 depicts the graph of the real rate together with the 
nominal interest rate and inflation.  The real rate remains stable for most of the 
period covered, though, it shifts during the 70’s and 80’s. 
Since the validity of the Fisher effect requires a stable real rate over the entire 
period.  If major shifts in the real rates are found, it is imperative to check for the 
                                                 
3 The findings are robust when I compute the inflation rate by using the personal consumption 
expenditure price index.  Although the BP method identifies one more downward shift for inflation at 
90Q4, the same conclusion can be drawn.  The results are not reported here but are available upon 
request. 
4 Here I use the actual inflation at time t to proxy the expected inflation, the same conclusion can be 
drawn if actual inflation at t+1 is used instead..  Though not attempted here, another possibility is to 
use survey data on expected inflation, for instance, the University of Michigan Inflation Expectation 
Survey covers data on expected inflation from 1978 to present. 
12 
sources of these “disturbances”.  If the structural breaks of the real rate is a result of 
shifts in inflation (Rapach and Wohar 2005), it implies that the nominal interest rate 
fails to keep a one to one shift with inflation.  Consequently, both the Fisher effect 
and the monetary neutrality propositions will be rejected.  As the timing of breaks in 
the real rate fit very well with the outbreak of oil crises in 1973 and 1979, and the 
1986 oil price collapse5, I examine if changes in relative oil prices can explain these 
shifts6.  Further, Caporale and Grier (2005) documented that changes in Fed regime 
represent different preferred equilibrium real rates.  Structural break analysis 
controlling for different Fed chairs will be implemented as well. 
Table 6 reports the structural break estimation after controlling for the relative oil 
prices.  Here I include the relative oil prices as an explanatory variable with a fixed 
coefficient and apply BP’s method in estimating structural breaks.  The estimated 
number of breaks is two which is one less than that if relative oil prices were not 
included in break estimation.  This result shows that changes in oil prices can only 
explain the real rate shift in 1973 which corresponds to the first oil crisis. 
Table 7 shows the results of break estimation if changes in Fed regime7 are 
                                                 
5 After the oil price had reached the peak in 1980 at over US$35 per barrel, it fell continuously in 
subsequent years.  In 1986, the oil price even slid down significantly from $27 to $10.  The fall of 
energy prices during the 80’s was commonly referred as to the oil glut and was a result of the reduced 
demand from the slowed global economic activity. 
6 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) maintain that real interest rate is affected by the level of relative oil 
prices 
7 The Fed chairs include William McChesney Martin, Arthur F. Burns, G. William Miller, Paul A. 
Volcker, Alan Greenspan and Ben S. Bernanke 
13 
considered.  I regress the real rate on the Fed regime dummies and used the residuals 
for break estimation.  The results indicate that no break can be found8.  This result 
is consistent with Caporale and Grier (2005) and implies that real rates are stable once 
the Fed regimes are considered.  In other words, the finding is supportive of the 
Fisher hypothesis because nominal interest rates and inflation move in line with each 
other over the period. 
1.4  The VAR-GARCH Model 
In the previous section, the results show that over the last half century, the 
relationship between the nominal interest rate and inflation fits quite well with the 
predictions of the Fisher hypothesis.  Since the structural break analysis reveals that 
there are lags for the impact of inflation on nominal interest rates, it is meaningful to 
see if the Fisher effect holds with the inclusion of such a dynamic effect.  Most of the 
previous literature has treated the interest rate and inflation as unit root processes.  
Nevertheless, many authors now cast doubt on the appropriateness of treating interest 
rate and inflation as nonstationary.  Table 8 shows the results of the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root tests (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller 1979) and KPSS unit root 
tests (Kwiatowski et al. 1992).  The test results question the validity of treating the 
underlying time series as nonstationary.  Considering the unit root test results and the 
                                                 
8 The same results are obtained when the real interest rates are derived from the inflation computed by 
using the personal consumption expenditure price index. 
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fact that both nominal rates and inflation fluctuate over a certain range for the last few 
decades, I will use a VAR model in levels to investigate their dynamic relationship. 
A bivariate unrestricted VAR model: 
 
1
p
t j t j t
j
Y Yµ ε−
=
= + Ψ +∑            (3) 
 
where tY  is a column vector of inflation and tax-adjusted nominal interest rate.  The 
number of lags, p , selected is nine and is based on the selection criteria of the 
sequential modified LR test and Arkaike Information Criterion (AIC)9.  To test for 
any remaining serial correlation, the multivariate Ljung-Box portmanteau test is 
conducted.  Table 9 indicates the absence of serial correlation when nine lags are 
used.  Since there may be volatility clustering in interest rates and inflation, I 
implement the multivariate Ljung-Box test to check for the conditional 
heteroskedasticity.  Table 10 reports the results and suggest that conditional 
heteroskedasticity does exist which may lower the efficiency of estimation by OLS. 
1.4.1  The VAR-GARCH Setup 
With regard to the well-documented persistent conditional heteroskedasticity 
problem in inflation and interest rate, I use a GARCH model to control for the time 
                                                 
9 The Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) suggests a more parsimonious lag length than AIC.  
However, considering the results of subsequent test on serial correlation, I use the lag length as 
suggested by the latter. 
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varying conditional variance.  In this regard, a GARCH(1,1) formulation is used.10 
 Referring to the conditional variance-covariance structure, I will use the BEKK 
model (Engle and Kroner 1995).  The advantage of this formulation is that it avoids 
the unnecessary diagonal restrictions which may be a potential source of 
misspecifications.  The appropriateness of using a full BEKK covariance model will 
be clear if the off-diagonal coefficients are statistically significant.  In summary, the 
model specification will be a VAR(9)-GARCH(1,1) as below: 
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* 11 12
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21 22
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B
b b
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=  
 
 
Equation (4) represents the mean equations for inflation and the tax-adjusted interest 
rate in the VAR.  Equation (5) is the conditional variance-covariance setup.  tH  
denotes the conditional covariance which is positive definite for all values of tε .  
Table 11 summarizes the estimation results. 
 Table 11 shows that most of the estimated coefficients in the conditional 
                                                 
10 I employ a symmetric GARCH model as the results from the sign bias test of Engle and Ng (1993) 
do not indicate the presence of asymmetry in the variance-covariance process.  Further, I estimate a 
GARCH-M model for each of the time series but the associated coefficients are not statistically 
significant. 
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variance- covariance structure are statistically significant at the 1% level.  These 
findings support the existence of conditional heteroskedasticity in the VAR model.  
The appropriateness of using a full BEKK model is clear as we check on the 
estimation results of the off-diagonal coefficients.  With the exceptions of *12a  and 
*
12c  in 
*
11A  and 
*
0C , all other off-diagonal coefficients, 
*
21a , 
*
12b  and 
*
21b , are highly 
significant.  It means that any diagonal restrictions may create specification 
problems.  To check for the sufficiency of the VAR-GARCH model, I implement the 
multivariate Ljung-Box portmanteau test for the standardized residuals obtained from 
the model.  Table 12 indicates that there is no serial correlation.  Table 13 shows 
that conditional heteroskedasticity has been controlled.  Figure 3 depicts graphs of 
the estimated conditional variance and covariance for the tax-adjusted nominal 
interest rate and inflation over time.  The volatility of nominal interest rate reaches 
the peak in early 1980s and is relatively mild for the rest of the time.  For inflation, 
the volatility is high during the mid-1970s, early 1980s and recent years.  It appears 
the highest at around 2007.  The timings of volatility surges coincide with some of 
the major economic events like the oil crises and the Federal Reserve Board’s new 
operating procedure in 1979. 
1.4.2  Impulse Response Analysis 
To examine the effect of an inflation shock on tax-adjusted nominal interest rate, 
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the impulse response analysis is employed.  Using the Choleski decomposition, I 
constructed the impulse responses for a unit shock in inflation on interest rate.  
Figure 4 depicts the graphs of impulse response together with their bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals.  The lower panel of Figure 4 shows that given a positive shock 
to inflation, interest rate jumps 0.25 percentage point.  It continues to rise and 
reaches 0.35 percentage point at the 10th quarter.  After that it falls slowly and the 
positive effect becomes insignificant after the 17th quarter.  This result indicates a 
positive impact of inflation on nominal rates.  In order to compare the entire effect of 
an inflation shock on both nominal rates and inflation, I construct the cumulated 
impulse responses in Figure 5.  The upper panel of Figure 5 shows that the 
accumulated inflation increases after an initial inflation shock and reaches 9.58 
percentage points at the 24th quarter.  It declines and stays at around 7.6 percentage 
point after the 47th quarter.  The lower panel of Figure 5 depicts the accumulated 
response of interest rates to inflation.  It increases from 0.25 to 6.92 percentage point 
at the 32nd quarter and then falls slowly.  Finally, it remains fairly stable at 6.14 
percentage point after the 61st quarter. 
 The findings indicate that inflation impacts positively on nominal rates as 
predicted by the Fisher effect.  The accumulated response of nominal rates to an 
inflation shock is 6.14% and is close to the accumulated response of 7.6% from that of 
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inflation11  I would see this result as evidence supporting the Fisher effect. 
1.4.3  Results Comparison by Using Alternative Methodologies 
In the previous section, the findings generally favor the presence of the Fisher 
effect.  The empirical setup has two distinct features which differ from the other 
papers.  First, I have treated inflation and nominal rates as stationary and have used 
the raw data directly for estimations.  Second, I have considered the time-varying 
conditional variance in the model formulation.  It is insightful to see how the results 
change if alternative specifications are used in the estimations. 
Figure 6 displays the impulse response of interest rate to a shock on inflation for 
the VAR model without considering the existence of conditional heteroskedasticity.  
Given a positive shock to inflation, interest rate moves to 0.156 percentage point 
which is a bit mild comparing to the previous setup.  The interest rate then rises and 
reaches the peak of 0.38 percentage point at the 6th quarter.  It continues to fall and 
become statistically insignificant after the 16th quarter.  Again, there exists a positive 
relationship between inflation and nominal rates.  Figure 7 depicts the cumulated 
                                                 
11 To check the robustness of results, I compute an alternative measure of the cumulative response of 
inflation by using a compounded inflation derived from the impulse response analysis.  The 
cumulative response of inflation becomes steady at 7.9% which is a bit higher than original result of 
7.6%.  Though the findings may reflect a higher degree of under-responding for nominal rates, this 
result does not deviate much from the Fisher hypothesis. 
Another check on the Fisher effect is done by using an augmented Fisher relation by including the 
consumption growth in the empirical model as suggested by the Euler equation.  Arnwine and Yigit 
(2008) found that consumption growth has statistically significant effect on nominal rates in the short 
run but its effect is only marginal in the long run.  Including consumption growth in my empirical 
model reduces the response ratio of nominal rates to inflation from 0.8 to 0.7.  However, the impulse 
responses of consumption growth are statistically insignificant over the entire horizon.  In this regard, 
I maintain that the results are still supportive of the Fisher hypothesis. 
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impulse responses for inflation and nominal rates given a shock in inflation.  The 
upper panel shows that inflation rises and peak at 7.90 percentage points in the 28th 
quarter.  It remains steady at 7.30 percentage points after the 60th quarter.  The 
lower panel of Figure 6 traces the changes of accumulated response of interest rates 
over time.  Nominal rates rise continuously and remain steady at the peak of 7.78 
percentage points after the 58th quarter.  Overall, the findings are similar to those 
when volatility clustering is considered and it supports the Fisherian link. 
In response to some of the previous literature which regarded interest rate and 
inflation as I(1) processes but found no cointegration relationship, the appropriate 
approach is to estimate a VAR model in first differences.  Figure 8 shows that a unit 
shock on inflation produces no significant effect on the nominal interest rates.  
Figure 9 depicts the cumulated impulse response when first differenced data are used.  
The graphs indicate that inflation and nominal rates stabilize at 1.0 and 0.26 
percentage point respectively.  The values of these accumulated impulse response are 
relatively distant apart as there is no overlapping for the 95% confidence intervals.  
This result rejects the presence of the Fisher effect when first differenced VAR is 
employed12. 
In summary, we can see that by treating inflation and nominal rates as stationary 
                                                 
12 Since the Fisher hypothesis focus on the relationship between the level of interest rates and inflation, 
the evidence from this first-differenced VAR model may not be taken as a strong rejection of the 
hypothesis. 
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processes, the empirical findings are supportive of the Fisher effect.  Even though 
the inclusion of GARCH effect may widen the gap between the accumulated 
responses of nominal rates and inflation, the findings do not deviate far away from the 
Fisher predictions.  Thus, the results are strongly in favor of the Fisher hypothesis. 
1.5  Conclusion 
This paper investigates the validity of the Fisher effect which is one of the 
unresolved fundamental issues in macroeconomics.  The understanding of the 
relationship between the nominal interest rate and inflation is crucial to theoretical 
researchers and policymakers.  Even though there is a huge volume of studies 
attempting to examine the issue, the findings are diverse and equivocal.  As 
conventional unit root tests find the interest rate and inflation as nonstationary, most 
previous studies use cointegration approach to test for the Fisher effect.  
Nevertheless, it is well documented that conventional unit root tests have a low power 
which often fail to reject the null of nonstationarity when it should be.  Over the last 
few decades, interest rate and inflation fell and rose after reaching certain peaks and 
troughs.  It seems inappropriate to use cointegration as the estimation approach.   
In this paper, the existence of the Fisher effect is examined in two perspectives.  In 
the structural break analysis, nominal interest rate and inflation closely resemble to 
each other in the break time, direction and magnitude of breaks.  Even though they 
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do not follow Fisher’s prediction in a perfect sense, the findings are strongly 
supportive of the proposition.  Further evidence is affirmed by studying the breaks in 
the real interest rate.  The result indicates that the real rates are fairly stable in the 
period covered.  The shifts of the real rate can be explained by changes in Fed 
regime which reflect different preferences of equilibrium real interest rates. 
In order to include any dynamic relationship between the nominal rate and 
inflation, I formulate a VAR-GARCH in subsequent analysis.  It also serves as a 
robustness check to the presence of the Fisher effect.  Unlike most previous papers 
which do not consider volatility clustering or use a restrictive conditional covariance 
structure, I include the GARCH effect with a full BEKK formulation.  The 
advantage of this framework is that it avoids the unnecessary diagonal restrictions.  
The impulse response analysis shows a significant effect of inflation shocks on the 
nominal interest rate.  Although the size of accumulated responses for inflation and 
nominal rates do not match perfectly, they are not far apart either.  The findings are 
strongly in favor of the Fisher effect. 
To understand the importance of different modeling, I compare the results with 
those obtained from two alternative models.  They include a VAR model in levels 
without considering the effect of conditional heteroskedasticity and a first differenced 
VAR model.  The results obtained from the VAR model are similar to my preferred 
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model and support the Fisher hypothesis.  On the other hand, the findings from the 
first differenced VAR model invalidate the presence of Fisherian link. 
In conclusion, the findings in this paper are generally in favor of the Fisher effect.  
Even though the results still deviate from the Fisherian view in its strictest sense, there 
are strong evidences that the Fisher effect is valid for the United States. 
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Table 1.1  Structural Breaks for Inflation Rate 
=============================================================
(1)TSupF   (2)TSupF  (3)TSupF  (4)TSupF  (5)TSupF  
20.9535*** 18.0849*** 19.2424*** 13.2274*** 13.9487*** 
(6)TSupF  (7)TSupF   
12.5149*** 10.0987***  
 
maxUD   maxWD (10%) maxWD (5%)  maxWD (1%) 
20.9535*** 23.4448***  25.6003***  29.7092*** 
 
(2 |1)TSupF   (3 | 2)TSupF   (4 | 3)TSupF   (5 | 4)TSupF    
20.8519***  23.6527***  1.9391   2.5360  
(6 | 5)TSupF   (7 | 6)TSupF  
1.8264   1.6081 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of breaks selected by Global Optimization Procedure 3=  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Estimated Break Dates  95% Confidence Intervals: 
1967 Q1     1965 Q2 – 1969 Q3 
1973 Q1     1969 Q3 – 1973 Q3 
1982 Q2     1981 Q2 – 1984 Q1 
 
Regime    %π       %π  
1 1.7118 (0.3982) 
2 4.7798 (0.4737)    3.0680 
3 9.1759 (0.7442)    4.3961 
4 3.0555 (0.3626)    -6.1205 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; the standard errors for all estimates are reported 
in parentheses 
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Table 1.2  Structural Breaks for Tax-adjusted Nominal Interest Rate 
============================================================= 
(1)TSupF   (2)TSupF  (3)TSupF  (4)TSupF  (5)TSupF  
8.8660*  10.0490**  40.2658*** 48.6364*** 40.7042*** 
(6)TSupF  (7)TSupF   
39.4354*** 41.8994***  
 
maxUD   maxWD (10%) maxWD (5%)  maxWD (1%) 
48.6364*** 81.1732***  90.1381***  107.8598*** 
 
(2 |1)TSupF   (3 | 2)TSupF   (4 | 3)TSupF   (5 | 4)TSupF    
14.2776***  27.1487***  61.6671***  16.2497**  
(6 | 5)TSupF   (7 | 6)TSupF  
4.9730   4.4474 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of breaks selected by Global Optimization Procedure 5=  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Estimated Break Dates  95% Confidence Intervals: 
1967 Q3     1966 Q4 – 1968 Q1 
1978 Q2     1977 Q3 – 1978 Q3 
1984 Q3     1984 Q2 – 1986 Q1 
1991 Q2     1990 Q4 – 1992 Q1 
2001 Q1     1999 Q3 – 2001 Q3 
 
Regime    %taxi      
 
%taxi  
1   2.2074 (0.0994) 
2   4.5407 (0.1496)    2.3333 
3   8.5576 (0.4000)    4.0169 
4   5.5572 (0.1595)    -3.0004 
5   3.7361 (0.1135)    -1.8212 
6   2.1282 (0.2164)    -1.6079 
============================================================= 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; the standard errors for all estimates are reported 
in parentheses 
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Table 1.3  Structural Breaks for Unadjusted Nominal Interest Rate 
=============================================================
(1)TSupF   (2)TSupF  (3)TSupF  (4)TSupF  (5)TSupF  
10.0171**  9.5105**  40.6625*** 49.2059*** 41.0014*** 
(6)TSupF  (7)TSupF   
36.4790*** 37.6794***  
 
maxUD   maxWD (10%) maxWD (5%)  maxWD (1%) 
49.2059*** 72.9977***  81.0597***  96.9964*** 
 
(2 |1)TSupF   (3 | 2)TSupF   (4 | 3)TSupF   (5 | 4)TSupF    
13.9403***  25.5380***  61.6671***  16.2497**  
(6 | 5)TSupF   (7 | 6)TSupF  
6.8347   5.8074 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of breaks selected by Global Optimization Procedure 5=  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Estimated Break Dates  95% Confidence Intervals: 
1965 Q3     1964 Q4 – 1965 Q4 
1978 Q2     1977 Q3 – 1978 Q3 
1984 Q3     1984 Q2 – 1986 Q1 
1991 Q2     1990 Q4 – 1992 Q1 
2001 Q1     1999 Q3 – 2001 Q3 
 
Regime    %i      
 
%i  
1   2.6327 (0.1264) 
2   5.6047 (0.1745)    2.9720 
3   10.6140 (0.4934)   5.0093 
4   6.8778 (0.1974)    -3.7362 
5   4.6238 (0.1405)    -2.2539 
6   2.6339 (0.2678)    -1.9899 
============================================================= 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; the standard errors for all estimates are reported 
in parentheses 
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Table 1.4  Mean Shifts for Nominal Interest Rate and Inflation 
============================================================= 
regime  mean-shift (π ) mean-shift ( taxi ) mean-shift ( i ) 
1 
2   3.0680   2.3333   2.9720 
3   4.3961   4.0169   5.0093 
4   -6.1204   -6.4294*   -7.9801* 
============================================================= 
* total mean shifts of the 3rd, 4th and 5th breaks 
 
 
Table 1.5  Structural Breaks for Tax-adjusted Real Interest Rate 
============================================================= 
(1)TSupF   (2)TSupF  (3)TSupF  (4)TSupF  (5)TSupF  
13.2717*** 16.6108*** 15.4316*** 13.7771*** 12.8127*** 
 
maxUD   maxWD (10%) maxWD (5%)  maxWD (1%) 
16.6108*** 19.6022***  21.7125***  25.7046*** 
 
(2 |1)TSupF   (3 | 2)TSupF   (4 | 3)TSupF   (5 | 4)TSupF    
20.9507***  14.4176***  6.1263   6.1263  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of breaks selected by Global Optimization Procedure 3=  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Estimated Break Dates  95% Confidence Intervals: 
1972 Q4     1969 Q2 – 1974 Q3 
1980 Q3     1979 Q3 – 1981 Q2 
1986 Q1     1983 Q4 – 1989 Q4 
 
Regime    %taxr      
 
%taxr  
1   0.0650 (0.3084) 
2   -3.3584 (0.6739)   -3.4234 
3   3.8640 (0.8410)    7.2224 
4   0.3944 (0.3354)    -3.4696 
============================================================= 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; the standard errors for all estimates are reported 
in parentheses 
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Table 1.6  Structural Breaks for Tax-adjusted Real Interest Rate Controlling for 
the Relative Oil Prices 
============================================================= 
(1)TSupF   (2)TSupF  (3)TSupF  (4)TSupF   
27.2320*** 39.1430*** 32.6186*** 25.9556***  
 
maxUD   maxWD (10%) maxWD (5%)  maxWD (1%) 
39.1430*** 41.9107***  44.9749***  13.0700*** 
 
(2 |1)TSupF   (3 | 2)TSupF   (4 | 3)TSupF     
22.9413***  8.8274   3.1922     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of breaks selected by Global Optimization Procedure 2=  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Estimated Break Dates  95% Confidence Intervals: 
1980 Q3     1979 Q4 – 1981 Q1 
1986 Q1     1985 Q1 – 1987 Q2 
 
Regime    %taxr      
 
%taxr  
1   1.3364 (0.4634) 
2   8.9150 (1.0165)    7.5786 
3   3.2374 (0.4097)    -5.6776 
 
Relative oil price parameter: -0.1629 (0.0271) 
============================================================= 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; the standard errors for all estimates are reported 
in parentheses 
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Table 1.7  Structural Breaks for Tax-adjusted Real Interest Rate Controlling for 
Fed Regimes 
============================================================= 
(1)TSupF   (2)TSupF  (3)TSupF  (4)TSupF   
2.7410  6.0604  4.1893  2.9056   
 
maxUD   maxWD (10%) maxWD (5%)  maxWD (1%) 
6.0604  6.4890   6.9634   7.7698 
 
(2 |1)TSupF   (3 | 2)TSupF   (4 | 3)TSupF     
6.5402   2.7220   1.6018     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
No break can be found 
============================================================= 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.8  Unit Root Tests 
============================================================= 
ADF      KPSS  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
i    -2.4426     0.4003 
taxi    -2.4218     0.4100 
π    -3.1160     0.2810 
10% CV  -2.5739     0.3470 
5% CV  -2.8747     0.4630 
1% CV  -3.4605     0.7390 
============================================================= 
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Table 1.9  Testing for Autocorrelations (VAR Model) 
============================================================= 
Multivariate Ljung-Box Portmanteau Test 
(4)Q   2.8735 
(8)Q   6.5331 
(12)Q   14.9104 
============================================================= 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; standardized residuals are used in the tests 
 
 
Table 1.10  Testing for Conditional Heteroskedasticity (VAR Model) 
============================================================= 
Multivariate Ljung-Box Portmanteau Test 
2 (4)Q   60.8971*** 
2 (8)Q   67.8183*** 
2 (12)Q   70.9907*** 
============================================================= 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; the squares of standardized residuals are used in 
the tests 
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Table 1.11.  Estimation Results of the VAR-GARCH Model 
=========================================================== 
Conditional Mean Equations 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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(0.5505)
(0.1358)
1.1554
0.2253
µ
 
 =
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(0.0734) (0.3336)
1
(0.0181) (0.0823)
0.0501 0.6032
  
0.0034 1.1830
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(0.0703) (0.4265)
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Conditional Variance-Covariance Structure 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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============================================================= 
Note: the standard errors for all estimates are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 1.12  Testing for Autocorrelations (VAR-GARCH Model) 
============================================================= 
Multivariate Ljung-Box Portmanteau Test 
(4)Q   6.9372 
(8)Q   23.4915 
(12)Q   31.6641 
============================================================= 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; standardized residuals are used in the test 
 
 
 
Table 1.13  Testing for Conditional Heteroskedasticity (VAR-GARCH Model) 
============================================================= 
Multivariate Ljung-Box Portmanteau Test 
2 (4)Q   12.0142 
2 (8)Q   35.0386 
2 (12)Q   46.4624 
============================================================= 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level; the square of standardized residuals are used in 
the test 
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Figure 1.1  Structural Breaks of Nominal Interest Rate and Inflation 
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Figure 1.2  Structural Breaks of Nominal Interest Rate, Inflation and 
Tax-adjusted Real Rate 
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Figure 1.3  Conditional Variance-Covariance (Inflation & Interest Rate) 
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Figure 1.4  Impulse Responses (VAR-GARCH Model) 
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Note: The above shows the impulse response of inflation and tax-adjusted nominal interest rates when a 
unit inflation shock is applied. 
The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval based on 1000 replications 
39 
 
Figure 1.5  Cumulated Impulse Responses (VAR-GARCH Model) 
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Note: The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval based on 1000 replications 
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Figure 1.6  Impulse Responses (VAR Model) 
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Note: The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval based on 1000 replications 
 
Figure 1.7  Cumulated Impulse Responses (VAR Model) 
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Note: The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval based on 1000 replications 
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Figure 1.8  Impulse Responses (First-Differenced VAR Model) 
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Note: The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval based on 1000 replications 
 
Figure 1.9  Cumulated Impulse Responses (First-Differenced VAR Model) 
 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Accumulated response of inflation to inflation
 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Accumulated response of interest rate to inflation
 
Note: The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval based on 1000 replications 
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Chapter 2 
How well does the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis fit in a sample of nine OECD 
countries? 
2.1  Introduction 
Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) assert that an improvement of the 
productivity of one country over the other will lead to a higher relative non-tradable 
price and an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  Given the importance of 
exchange rate dynamics in the field of open economy, the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis (BSH) of productivity shocks on real exchange rates has been a much 
debated topic for the last few decades.  Most empirical papers employ cointegration 
techniques to study the relationship among the economic variables and their findings 
are diverse.  For instance, Strauss (1996), Canzoneri et al. (1999) and Alexius (2005) 
support BSH.  Meanwhile, Rogoff (1992) fails to find evidence in favor of the BSH 
and the findings of Chinn (2000) are mixed.  In these papers, the authors also 
investigate the impact of demand-side factors on real exchange rates in addition to the 
productivity effects.  Another issue which arouses concern is the appropriateness of 
applying cointegration techniques.  With the development of new empirical methods, 
a number of recent papers have rejected the unit root hypothesis of real exchange rates 
or of the related economic time series (Wu (1996), Strauss (1999) and Parikh and 
Wakerly (2000)). 
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In this paper, I examine the validity of the BSH for nine OECD countries using 
the US as the base country.  Instead of using the cointegration method, I estimate the 
structural breaks for real exchange rates, relative non-tradable prices and productivity 
differentials.  Consequently, the timing and direction of breaks for the time series 
will be monitored to see if they fit the BSH.  If the BSH holds, an upward shift of 
productivity differentials (i.e. improvement of productivity relative to the US) should 
accompany an upward shift of relative non-tradable prices and an appreciation of real 
exchange rates.  The findings are slightly in favor of the BSH since four of the nine 
countries fit the hypothesis relatively well and three partially fit the BSH.  However, 
the remaining two countries violate the proposition.  Similar results are obtained 
when government spending is considered in the break estimations. 
In the second part of the paper, I use a VAR-GARCH model to investigate the 
dynamic relationship among the time series.  The inclusion of the GARCH 
formulation is necessary due to the existence of volatility clustering.  The findings 
support a strong link between productivity shocks and real exchange rates when the 
time series are either treated as I(0) or I(1).  The response of relative non-tradable 
prices generally has the expected sign but is comparatively mild. 
In response to the growing literature which suggest an alternative transmission 
channel for productivity shock (Betts and Kehoe 2006, Lee and Tang 2007), I replace 
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the relative non-tradable price by the real exchange rate of tradable goods and 
compute the impulse responses when a unit productivity shock is applied.  The 
results indicate that the effect of a productivity shock may also be transmitted via this 
alternative channel. 
The subsequent sections in this paper will be organized as follows.  Section 2 is 
a brief literature review.  Section 3 describes the dataset and provides a preliminary 
check on the relationships of productivity differentials, relative non-tradable prices 
and real exchange rates.  In section 4, I estimate the structural breaks and examine 
whether the direction and timing of breaks fit the BSH.  Section 5 examines the 
dynamic relationships of the time series by using a VAR-GARCH model.  In section 
6, I check the robustness of the results by treating the time series as I(1) processes.  
Furthermore, I investigate the impact of productivity shocks on the real exchange rate 
of tradable goods and the real exchange rate.  In the final section, I conclude the 
paper. 
2.2  Literature Review 
The Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis (BSH) originates from Balassa (1964) and 
Samuelson (1964).  The hypothesis predicts that an improvement in productivities of 
the home country to that of the foreign country will lead to an increase in relative 
non-tradable prices (in terms of the tradable prices) and an appreciation of the home 
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country’s real exchange rates.  The argument is that productivity shocks, which fall 
mainly on the tradable sectors, will affect the price ratio of non-tradable goods to 
tradable goods.  The changes in relative prices in turn will impact the real exchange 
rate.  In their original framework, the authors regard productivity as the most 
important factor in explaining the changes in real exchange rates.  They assume that 
factors are perfectly mobile across sectors and hence the demand-side forces will not 
affect the relative prices.  Officer (1976) is one of the early papers which examine 
the effect of productivity shocks on real exchange rates.  He conducts cross-sectional 
studies on a sample of fifteen countries for each year from 1950 to 1973.  His 
findings indicate that there is no significant relationship between real exchange rates 
and productivity differentials.  In another study, Hsieh (1982) examines the impact 
of productivity on real exchange rates for each of the eight OECD countries included.  
His approach allows for studying the validity of BSH individually for each country 
and the results generally agree with the hypothesis.  With the growing use of time 
series methods, conventional unit root tests always suggest the non-stationarity of the 
related economic variables.  As a result, the majority of later empirical works 
employ cointegration techniques.  Rogoff (1992) uses the Engle and Granger (1987) 
cointegration method to investigate both government expenditures and productivity 
shocks as important determinants of real exchange rates.  He collects quarterly data 
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on Japan from 1975 to 1990 and taking the US as the base country.  He fails to find 
significant relationships between productivity differentials and real exchange rates for 
Japan and the US.  Furthermore, he finds that increases in government spending will 
lead to the depreciation of real exchange rates which is opposite to his prediction.  
Strauss (1996) applies the Johansen and Juselius (1990) method and finds support for 
the BSH.  Using annual data of six OECD countries from 1960 to 1990 and taking 
Germany as the benchmark, he shows that domestic and foreign productivity 
differentials do explain the changes in real exchange rates in a way as predicted by the 
BSH.  Canzoneri et al. (1999) examines two important components of the BSH by 
applying panel cointegration to a sample of 13 OECD countries.  First, they test 
whether the variation of relative non-tradable prices reflect changes in relative labor 
productivities.  Second, they investigate the validity of assuming the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) to hold for tradable goods.  Their results support the effect of 
relative labor productivities on real exchange rates.  However, whether the PPP for 
tradable goods holds or not depends on the choice of the numeraire currency.  Chinn 
(2000) focuses on nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region and has mixed findings.  
The author assembles sectoral data for his sample of countries from 1970 to 1992.  
Using an error correction model, he examines the link between real exchange rates 
and relative prices, and between real exchange rates and productivity differentials.  
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The results indicate that relative prices have impact on real exchange rates only for 
Indonesia, Japan and Korea.  Meanwhile, only Japan, Malaysia and Philippines 
report a significant effect of productivity on real exchange rates.  In addition, 
government spending does not appear to have impact on real exchange rates in his 
paper.  In a more recent paper, Alexius (2005) examines the effect of productivity 
shocks, monetary shocks, and government expenditures on real exchange rates.  The 
author includes four countries in his dataset and investigates each of the bilateral 
relationships by the cointegration method.  His findings show that productivity 
shocks are the most important factor determining the real exchange rates.  Galstyan 
and Lane (2009) investigates the effect of productivity differentials, government 
consumption and government investment on real exchange rates for the European 
Union, the US and Japan.  The authors apply the Dynamic Ordinary Least Square 
method and find that increases in productivity differentials and government 
consumption lead to the appreciation of real exchange rates.  However, the effect of 
government investment can be either positive or negative. 
The appropriateness of using a cointegration approach depends on whether the 
underlying time series are integrated of the same order.  Considering some of the 
recent literature, there is doubt about the use of cointegration methods.  Wu (1996) 
admits the low power of conventional unit root tests, he employs a panel unit root test 
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based on Levin and Lin (1992) for his sample of 18 OECD countries.  The results 
support the stationarity of real exchange rates.  In another study, Parikh and Wakerly 
(2000) find similar results in their panel unit root test.  In examining the validity of 
the BSH, Strauss (1999) conducts panel unit root tests on relative non-tradable prices, 
productivity differentials, share of government spending on GDP, and real exchange 
rates.  The results reveal that all these variables follow a stationary process.  The 
author suggests that the impact of productivity differentials and government spending 
reflects their persistent effect on relative non-tradable prices and real exchange rates.  
In response to these recent findings, Bahmani-Oskooee and Nasir (2004) employ the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach for forty-four countries using 
annual data from 1960 to 1990.  Taking the US as the base country, they studied the 
relationship between productivity differentials for each of the countries.  Their 
findings support the BSH in thirty-two countries out of the total forty-four. 
Some recent papers, for instance, Betts and Kehoe (2006) and Lee and Tang 
(2007)13, have identified deviation in tradable prices as an alternative transmission 
channel for the effect of productivity shocks on real exchange rates.  In the former 
paper, the authors investigate the bilateral exchange rate for the five major trading 
partners of the US with the US dollar as the numeraire.  To assess the relationship 
                                                 
13 In both papers, the authors show that the real exchange rate (RER) is the sum of the real exchange 
rate of tradable goods (RERt)and the relative non-tradable price (RP): 
      RER = RERt + RP 
Hence, both RERt and RP can affect the real exchange rate. 
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between real exchange rates and relative non-tradable prices, they compute three 
different statistics.  These include the sample correlation between real exchange rates 
and relative non-tradable prices, ratio of sample standard deviation between real 
exchange rates and relative non-tradable prices, and the variance decomposition in 
which the proportion of fluctuations for real exchange rates are due to relative prices.  
They find that tradable prices, instead of non-tradable prices, explain a large fraction 
of real exchange rate fluctuations.  Lee and Tang (2007) use panel cointegration 
techniques to examine the effect of productivity differentials on real exchange rates.  
The results support that productivity shocks have an impact on real exchange rates in 
line with the BSH.  However, the transmission is via the tradable-based exchange 
rates rather than the non-tradable counterpart. 
2.2.1  The Approach of this Paper 
In this paper, I use an approach that departs from conventional methods in 
investigating the validity of the BSH.  The methodology here is based on Grier and 
Ye (2008).  In the first part of the paper, I estimate the structural breaks for real 
exchange rates, productivity differentials and relative non-tradable prices for each of 
the nine OECD countries taking the US as the base country.  The timing and 
direction of breaks will then be evaluated in detail.  In the next section, I examine the 
dynamic relationship of the time series.  Since some of the recent literature doubts 
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the non-stationarity of the related variables, the appropriateness of applying 
cointegration methods is being questioned.  Here I formulate a VAR model by using 
the raw data.  In that, I investigate if productivity shocks have a persistent effect on 
relative prices and real exchange rates.  Since conditional heteroskasticity is found to 
exist, I include GARCH effects in the model as well.  To complete the analysis, I 
implement alternative approaches and compare the results to see if new insights are 
obtained. 
2.3  The Dataset 
 The dataset consists of nine OECD countries - Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  
In all relative measures, the United States will be taken as the base country.  The data 
comes from the International Financial Statistics and is quarterly.  Due to the 
availability of data, the time period used varies with the countries.  The time span 
ranges from 1957Q1 to 2007Q4 (Canada and the UK) to 1987Q2 to 2007Q4 (New 
Zealand)14. 
 Productivity is measured by the logarithm of the real GDP per capita.  Hence, 
the productivity differential is the difference between the productivity of the home 
country to that of the US.  The non-tradable prices, as measured by the tradables, are 
                                                 
14 The time period of data for all countries end at 07Q4 but with different starting points: Australia 
(59Q3), Canada (57Q1), Germany (60Q1), Japan (60Q1), Korea (70Q1), Mexico (85Q1), New Zealand 
(87Q2), Switzerland (70Q1) and the UK (57Q1). 
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the logarithm differences between the consumer price index (CPI) and the producer 
price index (PPI).  Since there are more non-tradables in the CPI than the PPI, an 
increase in this measure is consistent with a rise in the non-tradable prices.  The 
relative non-tradable prices will then be the difference between the non-tradable 
prices of the home country and the US’s.  Finally, the CPI based logarithm real 
exchange rates are used in this paper15. 
 Before turning to my empirical approach, it will be interesting to have some 
preliminary idea about the relationship among the productivity differentials, relative 
prices, and real exchange rates for these countries.  Table 1 reports the correlation 
coefficients between each pair of variables.  ( , )R α ρ , ( , )R qα and ( , )R qρ  denote 
the correlations between productivity differentials and relative prices, productivity 
differentials and real exchange rates, and relative prices and real exchange rates.  
The BSH postulates a positive value for ( , )R α ρ  while it should be negative for 
( , )R qα  and ( , )R qρ .  The results show that five of the countries are consistent 
with the hypothesis - Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland.  For 
the other countries, they deviate from the BSH in at least one of the correlation 
coefficients.  For instance, the productivity differentials of Germany are negatively 
correlated with the real exchange rate as predicted by the hypothesis.  However, 
                                                 
15 Similar measurements for productivity differentials, relative prices and real exchange rates are used 
in the literature.  See Balassa (1964), Engel (1999), De Loach (2001) and Alexius (2005). 
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there is a negative relationship between productivity differentials and relative prices 
and a positive relationship between prices and real exchange rates. 
2.4  Empirical Setup of the Structural Break Estimation 
 In estimating the structural breaks of productivity differentials, relative prices 
and real exchange rates, I apply the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) (Hereafter BP) 
methodology.  In this case, the structural break of the time series are estimated by 
using a pure mean-shifting setup as specified below: 
, ,
j
i t t i i ty z uγ= +       (1) 
where ,i ty  is the productivity differentials, relative prices or real exchange rates
16 
for country i  while tz  is a constant equal to one.  
j
iγ  is the estimated mean for 
country i  and the value of this mean varies with the regime j .  If the BSH is valid, 
we will expect these data series to exhibit close matching of breaks in the specified 
directions.  For instance, an upward shift in the productivity differentials 
(representing the productivity improvement of the home country relative to that of the 
US) should be accompanied with an upward shift in the relative prices and a 
downward shift in the real exchange rate (appreciation).  Table 2 reports the 
estimated breaks for the productivity differentials, relative prices and real exchange 
                                                 
16 In the case of Germany, the Deutsche Mark was replaced by the Euro in 1999.  In order to account 
for the change in unit of measurement, I regress the real exchange rate against a time dummy of its 
adopting the Euro.  The residuals are then taken as the real exchange rate of Germany after controlling 
for the difference in scale of measurement during the two periods.  This adjusted real exchange rate 
will be used in subsequent estimations. 
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rates for each of the countries.  For ease of comparison, Figure 1 shows graphically 
how well the breaks are being matched. 
2.4.1  Matching of Breaks 
 In comparing the breaks for the time series, I will search for breaks in 
productivity differentials and then check if there are corresponding shifts, which are 
close in the timing and with the expected break direction, in both relative prices and 
real exchange rates.  This is consistent with the BSH which regards productivity 
differentials as the source of variations in relative prices and real exchange rates.  
The results show that once the breaks of productivity differentials are identified, only 
four countries do have matching shifts with the predicted directions in both relative 
non-tradable prices and real exchange rates.  For the other countries, there are either 
missing links between the time series or movements in real exchange rates and 
relative prices violating the BSH. 
Countries with Breaks Consistent with the BSH 
 Australia, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland are the countries which show evidence 
of matching breaks in real exchange rates and relative prices for shifts in productivity 
differentials.  For Australia and Canada, their productivities deteriorate relative to 
that of the US at similar point of time in 83Q1 (Australia) and 82Q1 (Canada).  In 
the case of Australia, there is a downward shift in the relative price and an upward 
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shift in the real exchange rate at 85Q1 and 82Q4.  All these shifts are in the predicted 
directions and have a break time close to that found in the productivity differentials17.  
For Canada, the relative price shifts in 79Q3 and is followed by another one in 93Q4.  
The direction of movement for these two breaks is in line with the BSH that a fall in 
productivity differentials will lead to lower relative prices.  Though the real 
exchange rate of Canadian dollar does not shift until 93Q4, this upward movement is 
still consistent with the BSH. 
 Turning to the findings for Japan, there are three breaks in each of the time series.  
The breaks for productivity differentials are in 69Q3, 77Q3 and 86Q2.  For relative 
prices and real exchange rates, the breaks are found in 66Q4, 74Q2, 93Q1 and 72Q4, 
85Q4, 00Q4 respectively.  Although the break time does not tie closely, all breaks 
have directions consistent with the BSH.  For Switzerland, the findings support the 
BSH as the shifts in productivity differentials (77Q2) have matching breaks in relative 
prices (75Q2) and downward movements in real exchange rates (75Q2, 86Q1)18. 
Countries with Mixed Findings 
 The findings for Germany, Korea and New Zealand are mixed.  The 
productivity differentials of Germany surges in 73Q1 which fit fell with the increase 
                                                 
17 There is another break in productivity differentials for Australia at 97Q3.  Nevertheless, the relative 
prices and real exchange rate do not have corresponding major shifts around this time. 
18 It is interesting to find that some of these breaks coincided with the time when these countries adopt 
a floating exchange rate regime, for instance, Australia (83), Canada (70) and Japan (71).  As long as 
shifts in productivity differentials are accompanied with breaks in relative prices and real exchange 
rates, I take this as evidence supporting the BSH. 
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in relative prices (72Q4) and the appreciation of real exchange rates (71Q4).  
However, the relative prices then exhibit two subsequent downward breaks in 84Q3 
and (1Q4 despite the fact that productivity continue to surge in 86Q4.  The real 
exchange rate does not show any breaks during this time even though there is a rise in 
productivity and a fall in prices.  In the case of New Zealand, the breaks in 
productivity differentials (97Q4, 03Q3) match very well with those of real exchange 
rates (97Q3, 03Q1) and in the predicted directions.  Nevertheless, the relative prices 
do not respond to productivity surge after a matching break in 98Q1.  For Korea, 
there are matching breaks between productivity differentials and relative prices.  
However, no breaks for the real exchange rate of the KoreanWon can be detected19. 
Countries Violating the BSH 
 The findings for Mexico and the United Kingdom deviate from the proposition.  
In both countries, shifts in productivity differentials are associated with movements in 
real exchange rates or relative prices at odd with the BSH.  For instance, the real 
exchange rate of peso appreciates even though the productivity differentials of 
Mexico are worsening.  Similar peculiar movements are found in the United 
Kingdom.  While the productivity differentials of the United Kingdom plummet in 
67Q3 and 75Q2, its real exchange rates shift downward in 77Q3.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
19 By visual inspection, there was a sharp decline of productivity differentials during the Asian 
financial crisis in 97 and this was accompanied with an abrupt depreciation of Won.  This evidence 
supports the BSH though it is not detected in the break estimation due to its transitory nature. 
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its relative prices rise in 73Q1 and fall in 84Q2.  Hence, the general results found in 
Mexico20 and the United Kingdom are not in line with the BSH. 
2.4.2  The Government Expenditure 
In the original idea of the BSH, factors of production are assumed to be perfectly 
mobile.  As a result, demand-side factors, such as government spending, do not have 
an impact on the real exchange rate.  Papers such as Rogoff (1992), Strauss (1999), 
Chinn (2000), Alexius (2005) and Galstyan and Lane (2009) generalize the BSH by 
including the government spending to GDP ratio as a factor affecting the real 
exchange rate.  If government consumption falls mainly on non-tradable goods, the 
relative non-tradable prices rise and real exchange rates will appreciate in response to 
an increase in government spending. 
 Since government activities may affect the relative prices and real exchange rates, 
the shifts in these time series may be due to changes in government expenditure 
instead of productivity differentials.  I estimate the structural breaks of relative prices 
and real exchange rates again by including the government expenditure as an 
explanatory variable.  The government expenditure is expressed as the proportion to 
total GDP.  The findings here serve as a robustness check on the previous results 
when government spending is considered. 
                                                 
20 The only exception is the undetected spike of peso which matches well with the fall in productivity 
differentials in 94Q3.  This period of time corresponds to the Mexican peso crisis.  For the rest of 
time, the movement of peso and productivity violate the predictions from the BSH.  Furthermore, the 
relative prices remain quite stable over the entire period. 
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2.4.3  Structural Breaks of the Relative Prices and Real Exchange Rates 
Controlling for the Government Expenditure 
 Table 3 summarizes the results of estimated breaks after controlling for changes 
in government spending.  The overall results only change slightly when government 
spending is considered.  This implies that government spending may not have a 
major impact on the shifts of relative prices and real exchange rates.  It is also 
interesting to find that when a country has a positive coefficient of government 
spending on relative prices, it will have a negative impact on the real exchange rate.  
It means that if government spending increases the relative price of non-tradable 
goods, it will lead to an appreciation of real exchange rates and vice versa.  The only 
exception is Mexico though the effect of government spending on relative prices is 
statistically insignificant. 
Figure 2 depicts the estimated breaks of relative prices and real exchange rates, 
after controlling for the government spending, along with the shifts of productivity 
differentials.  Countries which follow closely to the BSH include Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, and Switzerland.  In the case of New Zealand and Switzerland, the 
inclusion of government spending improves their fit with the hypothesis.  For Korea, 
shifts in productivity differentials match well with the relative non-tradable prices.  
However, its real exchange rates depreciate when both relative prices and productivity 
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differentials shift upward.  Similar to the previous section, the findings for Mexico 
and the United Kingdom disagree with the BSH.  Thus, the same conclusion can be 
drawn for these countries.  Finally, the inclusion of government spending weakens 
the evidence of BSH for Australia and Germany.  Even though the fall in 
productivity in Australia during 83Q1 matches well with the drop in relative prices in 
84Q2, there is no major change in the real exchange rate around this period.  For 
Germany, the real exchange rate depreciates in 98Q4.  However, there is no 
corresponding shift in the productivity differentials at this time.  Again, the relative 
non-tradable prices fall with improving productivities.  This violates the proposition 
of the BSH. 
2.5  The Dynamic Effects of Productivity Differentials, Relative Prices and Real 
Exchange Rates 
The structural break analyses provide useful insight on the co-movements of 
productivity differentials, relative prices, and real exchange rates.  In view of the 
long run relationship among the time series, it is likely that they affect each other over 
time.  Furthermore, there maybe feedback effects among these economic variables.  
In this section, I consider a VAR model to capture this dynamic relationship.  There 
are advantages of using this model formulation.  First, the model examines the 
inter-relationship of all the variables in a single framework.  Second, the impact of 
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shocks in productivity differentials can be determined in the subsequent impulse 
response analysis.  Finally, it serves as a robustness check for the validity of the 
BSH. 
 Many of the previous papers have treated real exchange rates, productivity 
differentials, and relative prices as non-stationary.  Consequently, they apply the 
cointegration technique or the first-differenced VAR model to investigate the 
relationship of the time series.  In light of the low power of the traditional unit root 
tests, the appropriateness of treating these time series as non-stationary becomes 
vague.  Recent empirical studies have employed the more powerful panel unit root 
tests to re-examine the stationarity of real exchange rates.  Wu (1995), Strauss (1999), 
and Parikh and Wakerly (2000) all reject the null that real exchange rates are unit root 
processes.  Furthermore, Strauss (1999) also finds evidence supporting the 
stationarity of productivity differentials, relative non-tradable prices, and government 
expenditure measured as a percentage of the GDP in his sample of countries.  Table 
4 shows that different unit root tests may produce different results for the time series 
due to the low power of these tests.  Table 5 reports the results when a Fisher type 
panel unit root test base on Maddala and Wu (1999) is implemented.  It indicates that 
the null of unit root processes are rejected for the variables considered.  Here I 
construct a VAR model in levels.  In this framework, I examine whether changes in 
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productivity differentials to have persistent effects on relative prices and the real 
exchange rate. 
2.5.1  The Empirical Model 
In order to examine the relationship for productivity differentials, relative prices 
and real exchange rates, the VAR model is specified as follows: 
1
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tX  is a column vector of the productivity differentials (α ), relative non-tradable 
prices ( ρ ) and real exchange rates ( q ).  The number of lags, p, chosen for each 
country is based on the sequential modified LR test and the Schwarz information 
criterion (SIC) and it ranges from 1 to 8 lags.  After estimating the above VAR 
model for each country, I check for the existence of conditional heteroskedasticity by 
implementing the multivariate Ljung-Box portmanteau test.  The results in Table 6 
indicate that conditional heteroskedasticity exists for all the countries in the sample 
except Mexico.  In response, I include GARCH effects and estimate a VAR-GARCH 
model for these countries besides Mexico. 
2.5.2  The VAR-GARCH Setup 
To control for the time-varying conditional variance problem, I employ a 
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VAR-GARCH(1,1) model.  In consideration of the computational efficiency and the 
number of parameters involved, I use the Constant Correlation Coefficient (CCC) 
model of Bollerslev (1990) for the conditional variance-covariance structure.  Hence, 
the complete empirical setup is as below: 
1 11, 12, 13, 1
1 1 1
p p p
t i t i i t i i t i t
i i i
c qα β α β ρ β ε− − −
= = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑       (3.1) 
2 21, 22, 23, 2
1 1 1
p p p
t i t i i t i i t i t
i i i
c qρ β α β ρ β ε− − −
= = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑      (3.2) 
3 31, 32, 33, 3
1 1 1
p p p
t i t i i t i i t i t
i i i
q c qβ α β ρ β ε− − −
= = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑      (3.3) 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1t t th a b hθ ε − −= + +            (3.4) 
2
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1t t th a b hθ ε − −= + +            (3.5) 
2
3 3 3 3 1 3 3 1t t th a b hθ ε − −= + +            (3.6) 
12 12 1 2t t th h hω=             (3.7) 
13 13 1 3t t th h hω=             (3.8) 
23 23 2 3t t th h hω=             (3.9) 
Equations (3.1) to (3.3) are the mean equations for productivity differentials, relative 
prices and real exchange rates.  As mentioned before, p is the number of lags used 
and it varies with the country under examination.  ith  and ijth , where , 1,2,3i j =  
and i j≠ , denote the conditional variance and covariance.  Equations (3.4) to (3.6) 
are the conditional variance of productivity differentials, relative prices and real 
exchange rates.  Finally, equations (3.7) to (3.9) are the corresponding conditional 
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covariance with ijω  denotes the respective correlation coefficient.   
 Table 7 shows the estimation results for the nine OECD countries.  The 
estimated coefficients in the conditional variance-covariance structure are mostly 
statistically significant.  With the exceptions of Australia, the conditional correlation 
coefficients follow the same pattern.  The conditional correlations between 
productivity differentials and relative prices are all positive.  On the other hand, the 
conditional correlation coefficients between productivity differentials and real 
exchange rates, and between relative prices and real exchange rates are found to be 
negative.  Table 8 reports the multivariate Ljung-Box test for the standardized 
residuals obtained from the VAR-GARCH model.  It indicates that conditional 
heteroskedasticity no longer exists. 
2.5.3  Impulse Response Analyses 
The BSH predicts that a positive shock in productivity differentials will lead to 
an increase in relative prices and an appreciation of real exchange rates.  Employing 
the Choleski decomposition, I construct the impulse responses in an order that when a 
unit productivity shock is applied, the relative prices and real exchange rates are 
affected subsequently.  Panel A to I of Figure 3 graphically depict the results.  In 
each panel, the graphs on the left are the computed impulse responses for productivity 
differentials, relative prices, and real exchange rates to an innovation in productivity 
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differentials.  Meanwhile, the corresponding cumulated impulse responses are put on 
the right hand side.  The dotted lines are the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
Generally speaking, the directions of responses for relative prices and real 
exchange rates are consistent with the predictions from the BSH.  In all cases, the 
relative price rises and the real exchange rate appreciate in response to a positive 
shock in productivity differentials21.  Even though some of these responses may be 
small and statistically insignificant, the findings still indicate different degree of 
support to the BSH for the countries.  I divide the countries into three different 
groups according to their closeness to the BSH. 
Countries which follow closely to the BSH 
 The countries included in this group are Canada and New Zealand.  The 
impulse responses for these two countries match well with the BSH.  When a unit 
positive productivity shock is applied, their relative prices surge and remain 
statistically significant for an extended period.  Similarly, the real exchange rate 
appreciates significantly over a long time horizon.  For Canada, the cumulated 
responses of relative prices increase and remain statistically significant in the positive 
region over the entire period.  Meanwhile, the real exchange rate of Canadian dollar 
appreciates in response to the productivity shock and the effect is significant for the 
                                                 
21 However, the findings also show that the response of relative non-tradable price for Germany turns 
negative and is statistically significant in the very long run. 
64 
first 56 quarters.  In the case of New Zealand, similar results can be found.  The 
positive effect on relative prices last for 42 quarters while the appreciating effect on 
real exchange rates become statistically insignificant only after the 24th quarter.  
Even though the impact of productivity shock on both relative prices and real 
exchange rates are less persistent compared with those of Canada, the results are still 
in favor of the BSH. 
Countries showing significant link between productivity differentials and real 
exchange rates 
 Most of the countries in the sample belong to this group.  Here productivity 
shocks lead to increases in relative prices and appreciation of real exchange rates.  
While the impact of productivity on real exchange rates is statistically significant, the 
response of relative prices is comparatively small.  Countries classified in this group 
include Australia, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK. 
 For all countries in this group, the real exchange rates appreciate in response to 
positive productivity shocks.  The cumulated responses of real exchange rates 
remain statistically significant for a time horizon ranges from 22 quarters (Australia) 
to 36 quarters (Japan).  These findings support a positive link between productivity 
differentials and real exchange rates.  However, the responses of relative prices to 
productivity shocks are minimal in all cases.  The cumulated responses of relative 
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prices are either insignificant for the entire period (Australia, Japan, Switzerland) or 
are only statistically significant for a few quarters (Germany, the United Kingdom).  
The findings here cast doubt on the validity of relative price as the transmission 
channel of productivity effect and it will be discussed in later section of this paper. 
Countries showing significant link between productivity differentials and relative 
prices 
The countries placed in this group are Korea and Mexico.  Given a positive shock to 
productivity differentials, relative prices surge and remain statistically significant for a 
while.  In sharp contrast, the responses of their real exchange rates are minimal and 
mostly insignificant.  The countries classified in this group include Korea and 
Mexico.  Given a positive shock to productivity differentials, the cumulated 
responses of relative prices for Korea keep on rising and are significant over the 80 
quarters.  Nevertheless, the responses of real exchange rates are small and transitory.  
The effect is significant only for the first three quarters.  For Mexico, its real 
exchange rates show restricted response to productivity shocks.  In contrast to Korea, 
the relative prices of Mexico respond over a short time to productivity shock and its 
cumulated responses are statistically significant only for 9 quarters. 
 In summary, the results of innovation analyses indicate that both Canada and 
New Zealand provide strong evidence to the validity of the BSH.  While the findings 
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for Australia, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are in favor of 
the BSH, the results of Korea and Mexico are not as strong as the other countries’. 
2.6  Results Comparison by Using Alternative Setups 
The results obtained in the previous section are based on treating the real 
exchange rates, productivity differentials, and relative prices as stationary.  In order 
to check the robustness of the results if the time series are I(1) processes, I implement 
a panel cointegration test of Westerlund (2007) among the real exchange rates, 
productivity differentials and relative prices.  There are two sets of test statistics,Pτ , 
Pα  and Gτ , Gα .  The former two are panel statistics and the latter two are group 
mean statistics.  The panel statistics are used to test the null of no cointegration 
against the alternative of cointegration for the panel as a whole.  On the other hand, 
the group mean statistics test the same null but the alternative is that at least one 
country shows evidence of cointegration.  The three columns in Table 9 report the 
test results for the presence of cointegration between real exchange rates and 
productivity differentials, relative prices and productivity differentials, and real 
exchange rates and relative prices respectively.  With the exception of the panel 
statistics for real exchange rates and relative prices, the results generally do not 
support the existence of any cointegration relationships.  In this regard, I construct a 
first-differenced VAR model and see how the results will be affected. 
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 Figure 4 Panel A through I show the impulse response and cumulated response of 
productivity differentials, relative prices and real exchange rates when a positive 
shock in productivity is applied for the sample of countries.  In the first-differenced 
VAR model, the computed impulse responses are short-lived.  Turning to the 
cumulated impulse responses, the findings reveal that both real exchange rates and 
relative prices move in the predicted directions.  Again, the results for Canada and 
New Zealand follow closely to the BSH.  As in the previous section, the findings 
support a strong relationship between productivity and real exchange rates for 
Australia, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the UK.  In the case of Japan, the 
cumulated response of relative prices is positive and significant for the first 16 
quarters upon a unit productive shock.  Finally, the evidence of the BSH is less 
obvious for Korea and Mexico.  The overall results imply that the BSH seems to 
hold even if the time series are considered as I(1) processes. 
2.6.1  Productivity Differentials and Real Exchange Rates of Tradable Goods 
The BSH postulates that changes in productivity differentials will affect real 
exchange rates through its impact on the relative non-tradable prices.  This is 
because if the purchasing power parity condition (PPP) for tradable goods always 
holds, the effect of productivity on real exchange rates will fall mainly on the relative 
prices of non-tradable goods.  In the previous section, the findings support a strong 
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link between productivity shocks and real exchange rates.  Nevertheless, the 
responses of relative non-tradable prices are small in many of the countries covered.  
Some recent papers suggest an alternative transmission channel through which the 
changes in productivity impact on the real exchange rate.  For instance, Betts and 
Kehoe (2004) and Lee and Tang (2007)22 both find evidence for the deviations of the 
real exchange rate of tradable goods in explaining the changes in real exchange rates.  
Here I examine the relationship among productivity differentials, real exchange rate 
of tradable goods, and real exchange rates by using a similar VAR model in levels as 
in the previous section.  In this case, I replaced the relative non-tradable price by the 
real exchange rate of tradable goods23.  Figure 5 Panel A through I show the impulse 
responses graphically for the countries considered. 
The findings support the notion that changes in productivity differentials lead to 
deviations of real exchange rate in tradable goods and the real exchange rate.  In all 
countries in the sample, the real exchange rate of the tradable goods appreciates in 
response to productivity surges though the effect is relatively mild for Korea and 
Mexico24.  Combining the results here with those from the previous sections, the 
                                                 
22 See footnote 1. 
23 The real exchange rate of tradable goods is represented by US H
t t t
e p p+ − where all measures are in 
logarithmic form.  
t
e is the nominal exchange rate with the US as the base country while 
US H
t t
p and p are the PPI for the US and the home country respectively 
24 The same conclusion can be drawn when I include both relative non-tradable prices and real 
exchange rate of tradable goods in the VAR model. 
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evidence is generally in favor of the BSH, however, the real exchange rate of tradable 
goods can be an important transmission channel for the effect of productivity change. 
2.7  Conclusion 
Given the importance of exchange rate dynamics in the field of international 
macroeconomics, the BSH remains a much debated topic.  Most empirical studies 
use cointegration methods in assessing the validity of the BSH.  Meanwhile, some of 
these papers extend the idea of the BSH and incorporate demand-sided factors in 
determining the real exchange rate.  Nevertheless, the findings of these papers are 
diverse.  Furthermore, there is doubt about the appropriateness of treating the 
involved time series as non-stationary due to the low power of conventional unit root 
tests.  Some recent empirical papers employ the more powerful panel unit root tests 
and deny the earlier claim of non-stationarity for the economic variables.  In view of 
these findings, the use of cointegration approach may not be valid. 
In this paper, I use a different approach to examine the validity of the BSH.  In 
the first part of the paper, the structural breaks of productivity differentials, relative 
prices and real exchange rates are estimated for each of nine OECD countries.  In all 
relative measures, the US is taken as the base country.  The results show that the 
breaks for Australia, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland fit well with the hypothesis.  
On the other hand, Germany and New Zealand exhibit a close matching of breaks in 
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productivity and real exchange rates.  Considering the effect of aggregate demand on 
real exchange rates, I follow the literature and include government expenditures in 
estimating the breaks.  After controlling for government spending, the findings do 
not deviate much from those when the demand-side factor is not considered. 
In another section of the paper, I formulate a VAR-GARCH model to examine 
the dynamic relationship among the variables.  Here I incorporate the GARCH effect 
in the model due to the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity.  Since the recent 
literature casts doubt on treating the related time series as non-stationary, I conduct 
panel unit root tests for the time series.  The results reject the null of non-stationarity 
in all cases.  Subsequently, I use the raw data in my empirical model.  Generally 
speaking, the results show varying degree of support to the BSH.  Given a unit 
productivity shock, the directions of impulse responses for relative prices and real 
exchange rates are in line with the BSH for all nine countries.  Canada and New 
Zealand follow closely with the BSH while Australia, Germany, Japan, Switzerland 
and the UK show a significant link between productivity shocks and real exchange 
rates.  Finally, Korea and Mexico show that relative prices react positively upon a 
positive productivity shock, however, the responses for real exchange rates are 
minimal and transitory.  As a robustness check to the results, I treat the time series as 
non-stationary and apply a first-differenced VAR model for these countries.  Similar 
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conclusion can be drawn when the time series are taken as non-stationary. 
The impulse response analyses indicate that there exists a significant link 
between productivities and real exchange rates for most of the countries in the sample.  
However, the response of relative non-tradable prices tends to be small in most cases.  
Consequently, I replace the relative non-tradable price by the real exchange rate of 
tradable goods to see if the latter could be an alternative transmission channel of 
productivity shocks.  In all cases, the real exchange rate of tradable goods deem an 
important transmission channel for productivity shocks. 
In conclusion, the findings in this paper are mildly in favor of the BSH.  The 
evidence that changes in productivity differentials will affect real exchange rates 
between two countries is strong.  However, the results also suggest that relative 
non-tradable prices may not be the only channel through which the productivity effect 
falls on the real exchange rate. 
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Table 2.4  Unit Root Tests 
======================================================================== 
   Real Exchange Rates  Productivity Differentials  Relative Prices 
   ADF   KPSS ADF   KPSS  ADF  KPSS 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Australia  -1.7112  0.2110 -1.1335  0.1637  -1.7985 0.2133 
Canada  -1.9189  0.1759 0.3329  0.1187  -1.1476 0.1605 
Germany  -1.8735  0.1893 -2.0594  0.2372  -1.7152 0.3074 
Japan   -1.2222  0.3230 -1.4694  0.2930  -1.9925 0.3886 
Korea  -2.9971  0.0804 -2.5509  0.1087  -1.2370 0.2128 
Mexico  -2.6136  0.0937 -4.3571  0.2534  -2.6550 0.1108 
New Zealand -0.8536  0.1441 -0.8189  0.1537  -1.4079 0.1464 
Switzerland -2.7164  0.1908 -2.6807  0.2165  -2.1923 0.1460 
UK   -3.4027  0.0354 -1.1711  0.3120  -1.1202 0.2255 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   ADF   KPSS 
CV (1%)  -4.0063  0.2160 
CV (5%)  -3.4333  0.1460 
CV (10%)  -3.1405  0.1190 
======================================================================== 
 
 
Table 2.5  Panel Unit Root Test 
======================================================================== 
   Real Exchange Rates  Productivity Differentials  Relative Prices 
 
Test statistics  62.7799**    66.5568**     84.8070** 
======================================================================== 
**, * denote 1% and 5% significance levels; 
The panel unit root test is based on Maddala and Wu (1999) in which the null hypothesis is the unit root 
process. 
 
 
Table 2.6  Multivariate Ljung-Box Test (VAR Model) 
======================================================================== 
    Level of Residuals    Square of Residuals 
(4)Q  ( 8)Q   (12)Q   2(4)Q    2( 8)Q     2(12)Q  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Australia  31.2012 64.8488 99.6720  65.7182**   110.1811** 630.0398** 
Canada  4.1288 27.9958 58.9111  94.6687**   134.9174** 177.7384** 
Germany  9.0529 56.8527 94.3780  101.0018**  113.0293** 130.1325*  
Japan   18.7576 49.9474 87.0466  72.5805**   108.6299** 154.3984** 
Korea  24.9927 62.2808 88.4065  66.4909**   119.5076** 129.7232* 
Mexico  8.1511 34.2916 50.8276  38.4858   52.3556  65.5265 
New Zealand 27.0996 52.5545 74.8837  62.0430**   94.1204** 123.6980* 
Switzerland 30.7572 79.6764 106.3314  48.6222**   77.9597  106.8909 
UK   3.6044 23.9635 60.3868  65.3604**   92.3227** 117.3757 
======================================================================== 
**, * denote 1% and 5% significance levels; standardized residuals and their squares are used for the 
test  
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Table 2.7  Estimation Results: VAR-GARCH Model (cont’d) 
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Table 2.7  Estimation Results: VAR-GARCH Model (cont’d) 
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Table 2.8  Multivariate Ljung-Box Test (VAR-GARCH Model) 
======================================================================== 
    Level of Residuals    Square of Residuals 
(4)Q  ( 8)Q   (12)Q   2(4)Q    2( 8)Q     2(12)Q  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Australia  33.3405 71.4156 97.7705  25.0145   52.4058  84.5848 
Canada  13.6323 39.0289 89.9962  29.6400   63.5262  89.9962 
Germany  35.6061 67.3306 114.4289  33.7985     62.2081  77.5880 
Japan   22.5591 58.6190 84.1907  22.3365     33.2031  64.1968 
Korea  33.1162 60.0805 102.3673  34.9866     59.5952  94.1573 
New Zealand 22.2477 53.0039 81.8876  22.3642   66.3613  102.9976 
Switzerland 32.0167 77.4238 101.0617  32.4757     70.6523  95.6521 
UK   25.3154 56.4967 93.0789  30.4976     74.4180  115.3447 
======================================================================== 
**, * denote 1% and 5% significance levels; standardized residuals and their squares are used in the 
tests 
 
 
 
Table 2.9  Panel Cointegration Test 
=========================================================== 
    ( , )q α    ( , )rp α    ( , )q rp  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Pτ     -2.482   -4.876   -6.014* 
Pα     -1.970   -4.805   -8.065** 
Gτ     -1.382   -2.187   -1.996 
Gα     -3.535   -7.500   -8.175 
=========================================================== 
**, * denote 1% and 5% significance levels; 
The panel cointegration test is based on Westerlund (2007); 
Pτ andPα  represent the panel statistics while Gτ and Gα represent the group mean statistics. 
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Chapter 3 
The Fisher effect: Evidence from nine OECD countries 
3.1  Introduction 
 Fisher (1930) suggested that the relationship between nominal interest rates and 
expected inflation can be represented by an identity in which the two variables move 
in a one-to-one manner.  Regarded as one of the building blocks in the field of 
international economics, the Fisher hypothesis has been widely used in both 
theoretical economic modeling and policy decision making.  For decades, the interest 
of studying the relationship between inflation and nominal interest rates has remained 
intense and new research works on the subject matter are bringing new insight to the 
literature.  In the mean time, the empirical techniques employed by scholars have 
also been evolving with the development of new econometric methodologies.  Early 
empirical work such as Fama (1975) and Summers (1983) applied least square 
method to investigate the Fisherian link.  After Nelson and Plosser (1982), there was 
more and more concern about the unit root behavior of many macroeconomic time 
series.  Based on the evidence from unit root tests, most later empirical works such 
as Evans and Lewis (1995), Crowder and Hoffman (1996) and Koustas and Serletis 
(1999) treated inflation and nominal rates as non-stationary.  Consequently, they 
applied cointegration techniques in their studies.  Even though the cointegration 
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approach has been the mainstream methodology used, there are other scholars 
suspicious of considering the time series as a unit root process.  The reason is that 
conventional unit root tests have low power, so the findings from these tests may not 
reveal the true underlying behavior of these variables.  For instance, Lanne (2001) 
and Atkins and Coe (2002) used empirical techniques which consider the possibility 
that inflation and nominal rates are indeed stationary. 
 In this paper, I examine the Fisherian link for a sample of nine OECD countries 
which include Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  This sample includes countries from different 
regions of the world and also data is available.  Instead of using the conventional 
approach, I study the relationship between inflation and nominal rates by two 
empirical methods.  First, I consider the Darby (1975) effect and construct 
tax-adjusted real interest rates for each country.  Subsequently, I employ the Bai and 
Perron (1998, 2003) method to see whether there are major shifts in real rates.  If the 
Fisher hypothesis holds, the real rates should be stable for the whole time period.  
The results indicate that shifts in real rates are found for all countries in the sample 
except Switzerland.  In order to determine the validity of the Fisher hypothesis, I 
investigate the factors which may have caused these major shifts.  In this regard, I 
follow the literature and consider determinants such as government spending and real 
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oil prices.  In addition, I also examine if changes in US Fed regime have a 
worldwide impact on real rates of the other countries.  The results indicate limited 
explanatory power for government expenditure and energy prices.  However, the Fed 
regimes do account for many of the real rate shifts.  Since some previous studies 
suggest that major shifts in real rates could be attributed to unmatched variations in 
inflation, it is imperative to check if the shifts in real rates are due to the failure of 
one-to-one relationship between the variables.  I investigate whether changes in 
inflation impact the real rates.  My findings reveal this possibility for four of the 
countries in the sample. 
 In the second part of my paper, I examine the dynamic relationship between 
inflation and tax-adjusted nominal rates by a VAR model.  From the mixed results of 
different unit root tests, it is doubtful to treat the time series as non-stationary.  Since 
the Fisher hypothesis is a relationship between the level of inflation and nominal rates, 
I use a VAR model in levels.  Due to the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity, I 
include a GARCH effect in the model.  To avoid unnecessary off-diagonal 
restrictions, I employ a BEKK formulation (Engle and Kroner 1995) for the 
variance-covariance process.  The computed impulse responses indicate that 
tax-adjusted nominal rates have very limited response to positive inflation shock.  To 
check if these restricted responses are due to inappropriate tax adjustment, I repeat the 
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estimations by replacing the tax-adjusted nominal rates with unadjusted nominal rates.  
Considering the results from both empirical approaches, only Canada and Switzerland 
follow closely with the Fisher hypothesis. 
 The subsequent sections will be organized as follows.  Section 2 is a brief 
literature review.  Section 3 describes the structural break analyses and interprets the 
results.  Section 4 examines the dynamic relationship between inflation and nominal 
rates. In the final section, I conclude the paper. 
3.2  Literature Review 
 The Fisher hypothesis is a well known foundation in international economics and 
has been widely used in both economic modeling and policy decision making.  
Despite its ubiquitous applications, the hypothesis remains a controversy in view of 
the tremendous research effort which has been put on it.  Among these empirical 
studies, two things are characterizing the literature.  First, the findings on whether 
the Fisher hypothesis is valid are mixed.  Second, the empirical approach employed 
has been changing with the development of new econometric methods. 
 Fama (1975) and Summers (1983) are early papers that examined the 
relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation.  While both papers had 
applied the least square method and treated nominal rates as a predictor of expected 
inflation using US data, they drew different conclusions on the validity of the 
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hypothesis.  Fama found that the Fisherian link seemed to hold for the US from 1953 
to 1971.  However, Summers suggested that the link between nominal rates and 
inflation was small and all the power of relationship comes from the period 1965 to 
1971. 
 With the challenge of Nelson and Plosser (1982) that many macroeconomics 
time series are non-stationary, alternative empirical methods were used in examining 
the Fisher hypothesis.  Rose (1988) used different measures of nominal interest rates 
and inflation for two sample periods: 1892 to 1970 and 1901 to 1950.  The author 
found that US real interest rates were not stationary and the findings are robust to the 
data used.  In another study, Mishkin (1992) used monthly US data from 1953 to 
1990 and employed the Engle and Granger (1987) technique.  His results supported 
the presence of a long term Fisher effect.  Taking the nominal rates and inflation as 
unit root processes, Evans and Lewis (1995) investigated the effect of inflation on 
nominal interest rates by using the dynamic ordinary least square method (DOLS).  
Their findings rejected the one-to-one relationship between the variables.  In 
subsequent section of the paper, the authors showed, however, that if economic agents 
formed their expectation on inflation with consideration of structural breaks, the 
Fisher effect would hold.  Using quarterly data of the US, Crowder and Hoffman 
(1996) studied the link between tax-adjusted nominal rates and inflation by applying 
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the Johansen (1988) method.  They found that there existed a one-to-one relationship 
between the variables during the period from 1951 to 1991. 
 Though most of the previous works have been focused on the US, there are 
papers which cover other countries as well.  Koustas and Serletis (1999) collected 
post-war quarterly data and examined the Fisher hypothesis for the US, Japan and 
eight other European countries.  They found that inflation and nominal rates were 
unit root processes, however, their evidence did not support any cointegration 
relationship between the time series.  Alternatively, they employed a first-differenced 
VAR model, though the results again denied the hypothesis.  Madsen (2005) 
investigated the Fisherian link by using a panel of 14 OECD countries.  The author 
suggested that the failure of previous works in finding the one-to-one relationship 
between nominal rates and inflation was due to their omission of accommodating 
supply variables in the model.  As a result, the coefficient of the expected inflation 
would bias downward.  Although the paper did show that the coefficient associated 
with inflation increased when supply variables were included, the size of the 
coefficient was still far below the hypothesized value. 
 With the development of new empirical methods, some recent papers questioned 
the appropriateness of using cointegration technique.  The findings of unit root 
behavior for the inflation and nominal rates may be a result of the low power of 
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conventional unit root tests.  In response to this ambiguity, some authors rely on 
empirical methods which do not require non-stationarity of the related variables.  
Lanne (2001) estimated an inflation forecasting equation by taking the nominal 
interest rate as the independent variable.  In particular, he conducted empirical tests 
on the estimated coefficient by using confidence intervals which are asymptotically 
valid no matter whether the regressor is stationary or not.  His findings support the 
Fisher hypothesis for the US during the pre-1979 period but not afterwards.  In 
another work, Atkin and Coe (2002) test the validity of the Fisher hypothesis for 
Canada and the US by using the bounds test developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(2001).  Their findings are in favor of the hypothesis.  Using a panel of 20 OECD 
countries, Westerlund (2008) developed and implemented two panel cointegration 
tests which are robust even in the presence of stationary regressors.  The author 
claimed that these tests consider cross-sectional data dependency and have high power 
compared with the conventional techniques.  His findings are supportive of the 
hypothesis. 
 In this paper, I do not rely on cointegration techniques but employ two 
alternative empirical approaches to examine the Fisher hypothesis.  While the first 
approach investigates the presence of structural breaks of real interest rates for the 
nine OECD countries, the second approach focus on the dynamic relationship 
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between inflation and nominal interest rates.  As for the latter, I consider in my 
empirical model a GARCH effect which has been omitted in most previous studies. 
3.3  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates 
The Fisher hypothesis maintains that there is a one-to-one relationship between 
nominal interest rates and expected inflation.  If this is the case, real interest rates, 
which are the difference between nominal interest rates and expected inflation, will 
remain stable over time.  In this paper, I consider a sample of nine OECD countries25 
and use quarterly data for subsequent examination.  The nominal interest rates are 
measured by the short-term Treasury bill rates.  Due to data availability, the 
government bond yields are used for Australia and Korea while the financing bill rate 
is taken in the case of Japan.  The inflation rate is computed from the quarterly CPI 
and is annualized.  The time frame of data varies with the countries and ranges from 
1985Q1 to 2008Q2 (Mexico) to 1957Q2 to 2008Q2 (Australia, Canada, Japan and 
UK).  The source of data is from the International Financial Statistics.  To account 
for the Darby (1975) effect, I computed tax-adjusted real interest rates for each 
country.  I follow Rapach and Wohar (2005) and Caporale and Grier (2005) and use 
the marginal tax rates reported in Padovano and Galli (2001) for the calculations.  
Since Korea and Mexico are not included in Padovano and Galli (2001), I follow 
                                                 
25 The countries include Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
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Mankiw (1987) and Koustas and Serletis (1999) and use the tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP as a measure of the average tax rate.  Subsequently, the 
tax-adjusted real interest rates26 for these countries are constructed. 
In order to check how well the Fisher hypothesis fits the real world, I apply Bai 
and Perron (1998, 2003) (hereafter, BP) methodology to estimate the structural breaks 
of tax-adjusted real interest rates27 for the nine OECD countries.  If the proposition 
holds, the real rate should be steady over the entire time horizon. 
 Table 1 reports the results of estimated structural breaks after applying the BP 
method for the nine countries.  In most cases, there are shifts in the mean of real 
interest rates during the period and the only exception is Switzerland.  Before going 
into details, only the findings for Switzerland support the Fisher hypothesis.  For the 
rest of countries, there exist one to four breaks in real rates.  Figure 1 graphically 
depicts the shifts in real rates for each country.  Australia and the United Kingdom 
recorded the highest numbers of structural breaks among the sample of countries.  
While the four breaks of Australia are found in 71Q1, 76Q4, 82Q4 and 99Q2, the 
estimated break time for the United Kingdom are in 68Q1, 73Q3, 81Q2 and 02Q1 
respectively.  Countries with three shifts in the real rates include Canada and Korea, 
                                                 
26 The ex post tax-adjusted real interest rates are used in this study. 
27 I use a pure mean shift setup: 
,tax t t j t
r z uµ= +  where 
,tax t
r is the tax-adjusted real interest rate, 
t
z is 
a constant of one and 
j
µ is the mean real rate for the jth regime.  
t
u denotes the error term. 
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their breaks occurred in 71Q1, 81Q1 and 99Q1 and 81Q3, 87Q1 and 00Q2.  There 
are two breaks in real rates for Germany (81Q2, 02Q4), Japan (72Q4, 80Q2) and New 
Zealand (86Q4, 99Q4).  Finally, only one major shift is identified in the case of 
Mexico in 88Q1. 
 Interestingly, if one takes a close scrutiny on the timings of breaks, the real rates 
often shift at similar points of time.  For instance, there is a “common” break 
identified during the early 70s for Australia (71Q1), Canada (71Q1), Japan (72Q4) 
and the United Kingdom (73Q3).  Similarly, the early 80s represent another time 
when the breaks are prevalent in the sample of countries – Australia (82Q4), Canada 
(81Q1), Germany (81Q2), Japan (80Q2), Korea (81Q3) and the United Kingdom 
(81Q2).  While the size of real rate shifts found in the early seventies and eighties are 
huge, there is another common break found during the end of 1990s or early 2000s.  
These breaks include Australia (99Q2), Canada (99Q1), Germany (02Q4), Korea 
(00Q2), New Zealand (99Q4) and the United Kingdom (02Q1) respectively.  Not 
only are there similar break times for the real rates, Figure 1 reveals that the directions 
of shifts are always in line with each other.  Generally speaking, the real rates drop in 
the early 70s, rise in the early 80s and drop again around the time of the new century. 
 Considering the above findings, it is worth investigating what may have caused 
the structural breaks of real interest rates for these countries.  It is interesting to 
 124 
 
know if the clustering of breaks around similar time among these countries is due to 
some common external factors.  In the coming sub-sections, I examine some of the 
possible factors which may impact the shifts in real rates.  First, I check if each 
country’s government expenditures explain the shifts in real rates.  Subsequently, I 
examine the impact of two worldwide factors, the real oil prices and the changes in 
US Fed regimes, on real interest rates.  In the final part of the structural break 
analysis, I investigate whether the shifts in real rates are due to changes in inflation as 
suggested by Driffill and Snell (2003) and Rapach and Wohar (2005).  If this is the 
case, it implies that the Fisher hypothesis is rejected for these countries. 
3.3.1  Real Interest Rates and Government Expenditure 
 The relationship between government spending and real interest rates has been 
widely discussed in some previous literature.  Blanchard and Summers (1984) 
examine the impact of fiscal policy on real interest rates.  In another study, Barro 
(1997) suggests that while a temporary increase in government spending will raise the 
real interest rates28, a permanent change in government spending does not generate a 
similar impact.  To examine whether changes in government expenditure explain the 
major shifts of real interest rates, I apply the BP method again for these countries 
                                                 
28 Barro (1997) examines the real interest rate during the five major wars for the US (Civil War, World 
War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam).  During these wartimes, government consumption is 
expected to be temporarily high compared with the other periods.  However, the empirical evidence 
does not support the prediction that increases in temporary government spending lead to high real 
interest rates. 
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except Switzerland.  This time, I re-estimate the breaks in real rates by controlling 
for the government expenditure measured as a proportion of GDP.  Table 2 shows 
that the inclusion of government consumption does not explain the breaks for most 
countries in the sample.  Australia, Germany, Japan, Korea and New Zealand are 
found to have the same number of breaks with or without considering government 
expenditure.  On the contrary, government purchase does explain some of the shifts 
in Canada, Mexico and the United Kingdom.  For Canada, the downward shift of 
real rates during the early 70s disappears after considering the changes in government 
spending.  Nevertheless, the breaks in the early 80s and the end of the 90s are still 
left unexplained.  There is more explanatory power for government expenditure for 
the United Kingdom and Mexico, while there is one break left unexplained in the 
early 80s for the United Kingdom and no break is found for Mexico.  The results 
also show that the government expenditure coefficient can be positive or negative.  
However, it is mostly statistically insignificant except in Mexico, New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom.  While increased government expenditures raise the real rates 
for Mexico and New Zealand, it lowers the real interest rates for the United Kingdom.  
As a whole, the findings indicate that even though government expenditure may 
account for breaks in Mexico and the United Kingdom, it does not explain the real 
rate shifts for most of the countries included in the sample.  Furthermore, it cannot 
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explain why there exist common breaks in real rates for many of these countries. 
3.3.2  Real Interest Rates and Real Oil Prices 
 It has been shown that the real interest rates for the nine OECD countries shift at 
similar times over the time horizon.  The findings lead to the conjecture that some 
worldwide factors are responsible for causing these shifts. To explain this 
phenomenon, Wilcox (1983) found evidence of supply shocks to the determination of 
real interest rates.  In particular, he showed that high energy prices would lower the 
demand for capital and dragged down the real rate.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) 
studied the determinants of real interest rates in major industrialized countries based 
on the interaction between investment demand and desired saving.  They estimated a 
system of equations for the real interest rates for each OECD country with both 
worldwide and own-country variable regressors.  Their results showed that real 
interest rates depend primarily on world factors rather than own-country factors.  To 
check if the worldwide supply shocks have been the forces behind the common breaks 
among the countries, I apply the BP method with the inclusion of real oil prices as the 
explanatory variable. 
 Table 3 reports the estimated structural breaks of real interest rates when real oil 
prices are considered.  Similar to that of government expenditure, real oil prices have 
limited explanatory power in accounting for the real rate shifts.  Surprisingly, the oil 
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price spikes in 1973 and 1979 do not help in explaining the shifts in real rates during 
the early 70s and 80s for these countries.  In contrast, crude oil prices may be related 
to the downward shifts of real rates around the new century.  Once energy prices are 
considered, the breaks of Australia (99Q2), Korea (00Q2), New Zealand (99Q4) and 
the United Kingdom (02Q1) no longer exist.  The timings of these breaks match with 
the surging oil prices since the beginning of the new century.  Finally, oil prices seem 
to explain the break of real rates for Mexico in 88Q1 as well. 
 In general, the results indicate that real oil prices fail to explain the major shifts 
in real interest rates during the early 70s and 80s.  However, it does explain the 
breaks in real rates around the beginning of the new century. 
3.3.3  Real Interest Rates and US Fed Regimes 
 Given the size of the US economy, changes in policy regimes of the US have 
also been suggested as the cause of major shifts in real interest rates for the other 
countries (Bodie, Kane and McDonald 1983, Tzavalis 1999, Divino 2009).  In 
particular, the changes in the Federal Reserve’s operating procedure in October 197929 
coincide with the huge real rate surges both in the US and the rest of countries at that 
time  Considering the findings that US monetary regimes are related to major 
                                                 
29 After Paul Volcker was nominated as the chair of the Federal Reserve Board, the Fed adopted a 
non-borrowed reserves operating procedure and increased the emphasis on M1 targets to combat the 
high inflation rate at that time.  For the United Kingdom, the election of Margaret Thatcher as the 
Prime Minister in 1979 may also help in explaining the shift of real interest rates at that time. 
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changes in real interest rates30, Bonser-Neal (1990) examined if shifts in a country’s 
own monetary regimes had similar impact on its real rates.  Nevertheless, the author 
did not find any systematic relationship between real rates and its own monetary 
regimes for Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom.  Consequently, I investigate 
whether the similar patterns of breaks in real rates for this sample of countries are due 
to switches in the US Fed regimes. 
 Table 4 shows the results of real interest rate shifts after controlling for the US 
Fed regimes31.  Consistent with the findings of previous studies, changes in US Fed 
regime account for the breaks during the early 80s for Canada, Germany and Japan.  
In addition, it also explains the major shifts of real rates for the same group of 
countries in the early 70s.  While the US Fed regime has limited explanatory power 
to real rate breaks for Australia, Korea and the United Kingdom, it does explain the 
breaks in Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico and New Zealand. 
3.3.4  Real Interest Rates and Inflation 
 The validity of the Fisher hypothesis lies in a one-to-one matching in inflation 
and nominal rates.  It means that an increase in inflation will be accompanied with 
an increase in nominal rates of the same size and leaving the real rates unchanged.  
                                                 
30 Caporale and Grier (2005) also find that shifts in the US real rates are due to changes in Fed regime. 
31 The US Fed chairs for these regimes were William McChesney Martin, Arthur F. Burns, G. William 
Miller, Paul A. Volcker, Alan Greenspan and Ben S. Bernanke.  For each country, I regress respective 
tax-adjusted real interest rates on the US Fed regime dummies and use the residuals collected for 
subsequent structural break estimations by the BP method. 
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In this sense, real interest rates should be neutral to changes in inflation.  If shifts in 
real rates are due to changes in inflation, it means that the one-to-one relationship 
between nominal interest rates and inflation does not hold.  Driffill and Snell (2003) 
examined the relationship between real interest rates to permanent and temporary real 
and nominal shocks for the US, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom.  
They found that the rise in real interest rates in the early 80s was mainly due to 
nominal shocks of inflation.  In another study, Rapach and Wohar (2005) estimated 
the structural breaks of real interest rates and inflation rates for thirteen industrialized 
countries.  Their results indicate that the breaks of real rates always coincided with 
the corresponding shifts in inflation.  Since both of these empirical works regarded 
inflation as the source of changes in real rates, their findings rejected the Fisher 
hypothesis. 
 As a preliminary check if variations in inflation lead to shifts in real interest rates, 
I estimate the structural breaks of inflation for each country.  Table 5 reports the 
findings of shifts in inflation and Figure 2 depicts the breaks graphically.  Comparing 
the breaks of inflation with those found in real interest rates, some of the breaks seem 
to coincide with each other.  For instance, the real interest rates of Australia that shift 
at 71Q1 and 76Q4 are close to those found in inflation at 72Q4 and 77Q4.  Similarly, 
the breaks of real rates for Canada at 71Q1 and 81Q1 match well with the breaks of 
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inflation at 72Q2 and 82Q332.  Even though the real interest rate shifts around the 
new century do not find corresponding inflation breaks in most cases, the findings are 
in line with Rapach and Wohar (2005).   
 As a further check, I apply the BP method to estimate the structural breaks of real 
interest rates, this time controlling for inflation.  The results in Table 6 show that the 
inclusion of contemporary inflation does not explain the major shifts in real rates.  In 
some cases, it even introduces additional breaks in real interest rates.  Since inflation 
may impact on real interest rates by its persistent changes instead of contemporary 
effect, I estimate the structural breaks of real rates by considering the inflation 
regimes33 as an alternative setup.  Table 7 reports these findings.  As a whole, 
inflation regimes account for most of the breaks in real interest rates.  In particular, 
there are no unexplained breaks left in Korea, Mexico, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom when inflation regimes are considered.  While only one break is left for 
Germany and Japan, two breaks remain for Australia and Canada. 
 Comparing the real rate breaks after controlling for inflation regimes and US Fed 
regimes, the former better explains the breaks of Australia, Korea, New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom.  In contrast, US Fed regimes account for more breaks for 
                                                 
32 Other inflation (π)and real rate (r)shift pairs include: Germany (π: 82Q4, r: 81Q2), Japan (π: 81Q2, r: 
81Q2), Korea (π: 81Q3 87Q1 98Q1 , r: 81Q3 87Q1 00Q2), Mexico (π: 88Q1, r: 88Q1), New Zealand 
(π: 87Q2, r: 86Q4) and UK (π: 69Q4 81Q2, r: 68Q1 81Q2). 
33 The inflation regimes for each country are based on the estimated breaks in inflation previously 
found in this paper.  For the US, Caporale and Grier (2005) found that inflation regimes do not explain 
the shifts of real interest rates. 
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Canada and Japan.  For Germany and Mexico, the results of break estimations are 
similar after controlling for respective regimes.  As mentioned, if shifts in inflation 
regime are the reason behind breaks of real rates, it deems the Fisher hypothesis 
invalid.  In view of this, I implement the J-test of Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) 
to compare which regimes better explain the real interest rates for this sample of 
countries.  Table 8 reports the test results comparing the Fed regime model with the 
inflation regime model when government spending and real oil prices are also 
considered.  The J-test chooses Fed regimes over inflation regimes for Germany, 
Japan and New Zealand.  In contrast, it picks inflation regimes for Korea and 
Mexico34.  However, it does not show preference to either regime model for 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom35.  Considering the number of breaks that 
remain after accounting for each regime model and the results from the J-test, 
inflation may better explain the shifts in real rates for Australia, Korea, Mexico and 
the United Kingdom.  On the other hand, the breaks in real rates for Canada, 
Germany and Japan are more likely due to the changes in Fed regimes.  Finally, the 
finding for New Zealand is mixed. 
 Table 9 summarizes how the breaks in real interest rates are explained by the 
                                                 
34 For Mexico, I consider inflation regime model as the preference as the null of inflation regime is 
rejected only at a 10% level. 
35 After repeating the J-test without considering government spending and real oil prices, the test select 
inflation regime model for the United Kingdom.  However, the test does not have preference to either 
model for Canada and Australia in a similar manner. 
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different factors.  The times shown in the table are the estimated break time in real 
interest rates from the BP method.  Below these break times, I have listed the factors 
which explain these shifts. 
3.4  Dynamic Relationship between Nominal Interest Rate and Inflation 
 In the previous section, Switzerland is the only country which has a stable real 
interest rate over the last few decades.  This finding supports the validity of the 
Fisher hypothesis in Switzerland.  For the rest of the countries, the presence of shifts 
in mean real interest rates makes the evidence less certain whether the Fisherian link 
holds or not.  To examine the relationship between tax-adjusted nominal interest 
rates and inflation, I formulate a VAR model and use innovation analyses to provide 
further check on the validity of the hypothesis for the countries.  Table 10 shows the 
results from different unit root tests.  While the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
(Dickey and Fuller 1979) test almost unanimously found that tax-adjusted nominal 
interest rates are non-stationary for all countries, the results for inflation are less clear.  
The null of unit root process is rejected at 1% level for Korea, 5% level for Mexico 
and New Zealand and 10% level for Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  
Turning to KPSS test (Kwiatowski et al. 1992), the results suggest that nominal rates 
and inflation are stationary for Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom at conventional levels.  Finally, I also implement Lumsdaine and 
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Papell (1997) test which allows for the presence of structural breaks in the time series.  
The computed statistics are even more in favor of treating nominal rates and inflation 
as stationary. 
 Taking into consideration the above test results, I use a VAR model in levels for 
the tax-adjusted nominal interest rate and inflation.  This formulation is also 
appropriate as the Fisher hypothesis focuses on the relationship between the level of 
nominal rates and inflation.  Hence the empirical model is: 
1 ,
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t j t j t t
j tax t
withY Y Y
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µ ψ ε−
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 
∑        (1a) 
Y is a column vector of inflation (π ) and tax-adjusted nominal interest rate ( taxi ).  
The number of lags, p , is based on both the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and 
the Arkaike Information Criterion (AIC).  Since the lag length suggested by AIC 
generally have better control of autocorrelations in subsequent residual tests, the AIC 
will be the primary benchmark for lag selection.  After obtaining the standardized 
residuals from the VAR model, I implement the multivariate Ljung-Box portmanteau 
test on serial correlation as well as conditional heteroskedasticity.  Table 11 reports 
the results.  The test results indicate that autocorrelations have been well controlled, 
however, the problem of conditional heteroskedasticity exists for the countries 
considered.  In this regard, I amended the empirical model by incorporating a 
GARCH component in it. 
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3.4.1  The VAR-GARCH Model 
 In order to deal with the time varying conditional variance, I follow Grier et al. 
(2004) and consider a BEKK model (Engel and Kroner 1995) for the conditional 
variance-covariance structure.  This formulation has an advantage that it does not 
require any diagonal restrictions which may cause a misspecification problem.  Since 
preliminary tests36 do not indicate asymmetric effects in the variance-covariance 
process, I use a BEKK setup as shown below:. 
1
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The mean equation is represented by (1b) and has the same setup as in the VAR model 
before.  Equation (2) is the variance-covariance structure, where tH  denotes the 
conditional covariance which is positive definite for all values of tε . 
 Table 12 reports the estimation results for each of the countries.  Since many of 
the off-diagonal coefficients are statistically significant, these findings indicate that 
                                                 
36 I implement the sign bias tests of Engle and Ng (1993) for asymmetry in the variance-covariance 
process for each country.  The results do not suggest the presence of asymmetry in either the positive 
or negative bias test.  Also, I estimate a GARCH-M model for each series, but the associated 
coefficient is highly insignificant in all cases. 
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empirical models with strict diagonal restrictions are misspecified.  To see if there 
remains any serial correlation and conditional heteroskedasticity, I conduct the 
multivariate Ljung-Box tests again.  Table 13 shows that these problems no longer 
exist. 
3.4.2  Impulse Response Analyses 
 In this section, I employ the Choleski decomposition and construct both the 
impulse responses and cumulated impulse responses when a unit shock of inflation is 
applied.  The order of variables comes from inflation to tax-adjusted nominal interest 
rates.  In Figure 3, the impulse responses for the nine countries are depicted.  In all 
cases, both inflation and tax-adjusted nominal interest rates react positively to 
inflation shock and this is consistent to the Fisher hypothesis.  Besides a positive link 
between inflation and nominal interest rates, the Fisher hypothesis also requires the 
time series to have a one-to-one relationship.  Hence, I compare the size of 
cumulated response of inflation and nominal rates for each country in the sample.  
Figure 4 shows the cumulated impulse responses for each country in the sample.  
Overall, both inflation and tax-adjusted nominal interest rates go up given a positive 
shock on inflation.  With the exception of Australia, Canada and the United 
Kingdom, the cumulated impulse responses of inflation and nominal rates for the 
other countries are statistically significant for less than 20 quarters.  It indicates that 
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we ascertain the positive cumulated responses only within these periods.  Since the 
bootstrapped confidence intervals tend to be large, I do not consider the existence of 
overlapping bands of impulse response for inflation and nominal rates as evidence of 
the Fisher hypothesis.  Instead, I compare the mean of the cumulated responses for 
both series as a check for this one-to-one relationship. 
 In general, the sizes of cumulated response of tax-adjusted nominal interest rates 
are small compared with those of corresponding inflation.  Amongst this sample, 
three countries, Canada, Korea and Switzerland, are exceptions.  For Canada, the 
cumulated response of inflation and tax-adjusted nominal rates stay close to each 
other at 18.10% and 18.39% respectively.  On the other hand, the cumulated 
response of inflation and nominal rates become steady at 3.69% and 3.24% in the case 
of Switzerland.  For Korea, the cumulated responses of nominal interest rates 
ultimately even exceed inflation by 0.66%.  While the responses of nominal rates are 
less than one-to-one for the rest of countries, they show varying degrees of 
“under-responses”.  For Germany, the inflation and nominal interest rates become 
steady at 3.27% and 2.22% which implies that nominal rates only reach 
approximately 68% of the hypothesized one-to-one ratio.  Similarly, the response of 
nominal rates for Mexico attains 69.67% of the hypothesized size of movement.  
Turning to the findings of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, 
 137 
 
the gaps between the cumulated response of inflation and nominal rates are huge.  
The cumulated response of inflation and nominal rates for Australia are 12.32% and 
5.78% respectively.  This corresponds to a 1 to 0.47 ratio.  For the United Kingdom, 
inflation and nominal rates stay at 14.13% and 7.66% which is a 1 to 0.54 ratio.  
Tremendous differences between responses of inflation and nominal rates are found in 
Japan and New Zealand.  The former country reported cumulated responses for 
inflation and nominal rates at 7.92% and 2.30% which represent a 1 to 0.29 ratio.  
The finding for the latter country is a minimal of 1 to 0.15 ratio with its inflation and 
nominal rates staying at 20.39% and 3.14% respectively. 
 The findings here show that tax-adjusted nominal interest rate tends to respond to 
inflation shock in less than a one-to-one manner except for Canada, Korea and 
Switzerland37. 
3.4.3  Inflation and Nominal Interest Rates 
 Considering the results obtained in the previous section, only Canada, Korea and 
Switzerland seem to fit well with the Fisher hypothesis.  Countries with inflation and 
                                                 
37 I also computed an alternative measure of the cumulative responses by compounding the inflation 
derived from the impulse responses.  The cumulative impulse responses obtained by this alternative 
measure are only slightly higher than the original measures for most countries in this sample.  In the 
followings, the figure reported on the left inside the bracket are the cumulative responses of inflation 
from the new measure while those on the right are the original measure --- Aus (13.06%, 12.32%), 
Canada (19.79%, 18.10%), Germany (3.31%, 3.27%), Japan (8.19% 7.92%), Korea (12.31%, 11.65%), 
Mexico (52.94%, 43.79%), New Zealand (22.46%, 20.39%), Switzerland (3.73%, 3.69%) and the 
United Kingdom (15.04%, 14.13%).  Though there is a larger difference found in Mexico, the result 
indicates a more severe under-response for nominal rates.  The same conclusion can still be drawn. 
Another check on the robustness of results is done by using an augmented Fisher relation with the 
inclusion of consumption growth in the model.  In this case, the response of nominal rates to inflation 
is slightly lowered.  Again, similar conclusion can be drawn. 
 138 
 
tax-adjusted nominal interest rates deviate fairly from the hypothesized one-to-one 
ratio include Germany and Mexico.  Amongst this sample, the findings for Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom cast strong doubt to the validity of the 
Fisherian link.  The overall results indicate a strong tendency for limited responses 
of tax-adjusted nominal interest rates to inflation shock.  Obviously, it will be 
meaningful to see if this lack of responses is a result of an inappropriate tax 
adjustment of the nominal interest rates.  In this regard, I re-estimate the 
VAR-GARCH model for each country.  This time, however, I use raw nominal 
interest rates without doing tax adjustment in the empirical estimations.  The 
corresponding cumulated impulse responses are depicted in Figure 538. 
 It can be seen that the limited responses of interest rates are not due to the tax 
adjustment used.  In particular, the responses of nominal interest rates of Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are still below the corresponding 
inflation.  One interesting thing to note is that according to Summers (1982), the 
theoretical response of nominal interest rates (without tax adjustment) to inflation 
ought to be within the range of 1.3 to 1.5.  Comparing these theoretical values with 
the findings here, Switzerland once again fit well with the Fisher hypothesis.  The 
cumulated responses of inflation and nominal interest rates become steady at 3.69% 
                                                 
38 For clarity, the confidence intervals are omitted. 
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and 5.02%.  This implies that inflation and nominal interest rates move in a ratio of 1 
to 1.36, which ties closely with the suggested theoretical value.  For Canada and 
Korea, the ratios are 1.15 and 1.18 respectively.  Although they lie outside the 
theoretical range, the ratios are not far below either.  Similar to the findings in the 
previous section, the responses of inflation and nominal interest rates for Germany 
and Mexico are limited when unadjusted nominal rates are used.  The cumulated 
response of inflation and nominal rates are 3.23% and 3.02% for Germany, which 
corresponds to a ratio of 1 to 0.93.  In the case of Mexico, the nominal interest rates 
stay below inflation with a ratio of 1 to 0.86. 
 In summary, the findings from the impulse response show that nominal interest 
rates and inflation have a positive relationship with each other.  However, interest 
rates tend to react in less than one-to-one ratio upon an inflation shock.  The 
evidence also shows that the limited response of interest rates is not due to the 
treatment of tax adjustments.  Comparing the results when tax adjusted nominal 
interest rates or raw nominal interest rates are used in the empirical model, the 
findings for Canada, Korea and Switzerland are in favor of the Fisher hypothesis.  
While the findings for Germany and Mexico are a bit mixed, the results for Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom reject the Fisherian link. 
3.4.4  Non-stationary Tax-Adjusted Nominal Interest Rates and Inflation 
 140 
 
 The findings of the prior sections are based on my preferred model of treating 
both tax-adjusted nominal interest rates and inflation as stationary and employ a 
VAR-GARCH model in levels as the empirical model.  Due to the mixed findings on 
the unit root tests, I examine how the results will be changed if inflation and nominal 
rates are taken as non-stationary processes.  If the time series are integrated of the 
same order, it is natural to check for the existence of cointegrating relationships 
between the variables.  Table 14 shows the results when the Johansen (1991) method 
is applied.  The results do not support any cointegrating relationships except Mexico 
for which the traceλ  statistics and the maxλ  statistics both suggest the presence of one 
cointegrating vector between inflation and tax-adjusted nominal rates.  The final 
column of Table 13 reports the coefficient of the cointegrating relationship after 
normalizing with respect to the tax-adjusted nominal rate.  Even though inflation and 
tax-adjusted nominal rate are positively related, the size of the coefficient is only 
0.7588, which is much less than the hypothesized value of 1.  Hence, the evidence 
once again shows restricted response of nominal rates to inflation. 
 Since there is no cointegration between the time series for the other countries, I 
implement a first-differenced VAR model and conduct innovation analyses for these 
countries.  Figure 6 depicts the cumulated impulse responses of inflation and 
tax-adjusted nominal rates upon an inflation shock.  In all cases, nominal rates fail to 
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match the predicted one-to-one relationship39.  Though a first-differenced VAR 
model actually only represents the link between the change in inflation and 
tax-adjusted nominal interest rates, the findings can be regarded as a denial of the 
Fisher hypothesis. 
3.5  Conclusion 
 The Fisher hypothesis is an important foundation in both theoretical economics 
and macroeconomic policies.  It is therefore crucial to know if the hypothesis is valid 
in practice.  In this paper, I extend my study to cover a sample of nine OECD 
countries.  By using quarterly data of inflation and nominal interest rates for the last 
few decades, I examine the Fisher relationship by two main approaches. 
First, I use a mean shift model and apply the BP method to estimate the structural 
breaks of tax-adjusted real interest rates.  If there is a one-to-one relationship 
between inflation and tax-adjusted nominal interest rates, the real rates will remain 
stable over the entire sample period and no structural breaks can be detected.  The 
findings are not supportive of the Fisherian link for all countries except Switzerland. 
In order to examine the reasons behind these real rate shifts, I consider some of 
the factors which have been suggested by the literature.  They include government 
expenditures, real oil prices, changes in US Fed regimes and the variation of inflation 
                                                 
39 The confidence intervals are non-overlapping in all cases and the only exception is Switzerland 
when the time horizon is more than 36 quarters. 
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of respective country.  Incorporating these factors into the mean shift model, I found 
that both government expenditures and real oil prices only have limited explanatory 
power to breaks in real rates.  In contrast, changes in US Fed regimes or switches in 
inflation regimes of respective country both explain the breaks that have been found 
in most of the countries.  Since it is imperative to know if major changes in real rates 
are due to unmatched movement in inflation, I implement a J-test comparing both 
regime models.  The results suggest that the Fed regime model better explain the real 
rate shifts for Canada, Germany and Japan.  On the other hand, switches in inflation 
regimes explain the shifts for Australia, Korea, Mexico and the United Kingdom. 
In the second part of this paper, I study the dynamic relationship between 
inflation and tax-adjusted nominal interest rates by using a VAR-GARCH model.  
The results from the subsequent innovation analyses show that tax-adjusted nominal 
rates respond positively when a unit inflation shock is applied.  With the exception 
of Canada, Korea and Switzerland, however, the responses tend to be small and are 
less than the hypothesized one-to-one relationship.  The findings are robust when 
unadjusted nominal interest rates are used.  Hence the results are not due to any 
inappropriate tax adjustments of the nominal rates. 
Considering the overall results, Switzerland and Canada are the two countries 
that fit well with the Fisher hypothesis.  On the other hand, the evidence for Australia, 
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New Zealand and the United Kingdom is not supportive of it.  The findings for the 
rest of countries are mixed.  In conclusion, the evidence of the Fisher hypothesis is 
weak based on the findings in this paper. 
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Table 3.1  Structural Breaks for Real Interest Rates 
Australia 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
13.49 * 26.22 * 28.62 * 25.81* 22.35 * 24.08 * 19.23 * 28.62 * 54.53 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
25.58 * 29.51* 19.04 * 7.56 1.53 1.40
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
3
4
1971 1 [70 1 72 2]
1976 4 [76 2 81 1]
1982 4 [82 2 84 2]
1999 2 [97 1 03 2]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
T
T
−
−
−
−
)
)
)
)
  
1
2
3
4
5
R
R
R
R
R
  
0.94% **
6.48% *
1.46% **
2.85% *
0.60%
−
−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Canada 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
13.31* 14.83 * 20.51* 30.05 * 25.80 * 21.58 * 18.55 * 30.05 * 53.43 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
28.43 * 18.48 * 9.13 1.79 2.13 0.82
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
3
1971 1 [63 1 73 2]
1981 1 [80 3 83 4]
1999 1 [96 2 01 1]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
T
−
−
−
)
)
)
  
1
2
3
4
R
R
R
R
  
1.03% *
1.71% *
3.01% *
0.35%
−
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Germany 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
9.82 * * 13.09 * 11.50 * 8.50 * 7.10 * 5.70 ** 4.96 ** 30.05 * 53.43 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
18.34 * 5.41 1.93 1.02 0.30 0.64
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
1981 2 [78 3 85 3]
2002 4 [01 1 06 4]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
−
−
)
)   
1
2
3
R
R
R
  
0.28%
1.47% *
0.06%
−
−
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.1  Structural Breaks for Real Interest Rates (cont’d) 
Japan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
13.29 * 11.99 * 9.63 * 7.95 * 8.39 * 7.29 * 6.41* 13.29 * 16.82 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
16.81* 4.95 2.59 1.72 0.24
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
1972 4 [68 2 74 1]
1980 2 [80 1 84 2]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
−
−
)
)   
1
2
3
R
R
R
  
0.19%
5.76% *
0.71% *
−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Korea 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
6.29 30.89 * 40.63 * 30.28 * 24.29 * 20.58 * 17.93 * 40.63 * 62.72 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
54.78 * 36.65 * 1.35
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
− − −
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
3
1981 3 [81 2 85 2]
1987 1 [85 1 88 3]
2000 2 [99 3 03 1]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
T
−
−
−
)
)
)
  
1
2
3
4
R
R
R
R
  
0.30%
9.41% *
4.80% *
0.78%a
−
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mexico 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
23.37 * 6.16 5.16 3.77 3.61 5.08 * * 5.66 * 23.37 * 23.37 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
5.54 3.72 5.80 5.73 4.59
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1 1988 1 [87 3 89 4]Q Q QT −
)
  1
2
R
R
  
24.80% *
2.97% **
−
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.1  Structural Breaks for Real Interest Rates (cont’d) 
New Zealand 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
39.83 * 58.00 * 42.40 * 33.13 * 31.28 * 27.43 * 23.25 * 58.00 * 74.35 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
15.53 * 1.64 2.35 3.84 0.20
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
1986 4 [86 3 89 1]
1999 4 [97 2 05 2]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
−
−
)
)   
1
2
3
R
R
R
  
7.38% *
1.91% *
0.34%
−
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Switzerland 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
5.96 8.12 ** 5.30 4.35 4.23 3.38 2.92 8.12 10.41
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
6.80 0.97 0.74 0.69
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
− −
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
No break     1R   0.09%−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The United Kingdom 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
15.12 * 19.96 * 17.27 * 14.69 * 13.53 * 11.54 * 10.28 * 19.96 * 27.14 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
23.72 * 15.28 * 15.28 * 2.56 1.46 1.30
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
3
4
1968 1 [64 2 70 2]
1973 3 [66 4 74 1]
1981 2 [81 1 84 1]
2002 1[00 4 07 1]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
T
T
−
−
−
−
)
)
)
)
  
1
2
3
4
5
R
R
R
R
R
  
0.09%
3.03% *
8.26% *
1.35% *
0.57% **
−
−
−
−
 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.2  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Government 
Expenditure 
Australia 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
8.37 45.90 * 50.48 * 49.17 * 38.65 * 41.51* 38.38 * 50.48 * 98.80 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
29.61* 36.58 * 21.83 * 5.60 1.46 1.20
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2 3 4
[71 1 73 1] [76 3 78 4] [82 2 84 4] [97 1 03 2]
1972 2 1977 1 1983 4 1999 2
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q Q
T T T T
− − − −
) ) ) )
  
Government Expenditure Parameter: 0.1792−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Canada 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
12.66 ** 27.90 * 18.49 * 22.92 * 19.86 * 19.14 * 16.25 * 27.90 * 43.34 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
26.66 * 8.64 1.10 1.25
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
− −
 
Break Time      
1 2
[80 2 83 3] [96 4 00 4]
1981 1 1999 1
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
Government Expenditure Parameter: 0.4057−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Germany 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
11.80 ** 13.86 * 11.79 * 10.64 * 8.66 * 7.49 * 7.98 * 13.86 * 20.54 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
16.40 * 7.99 1.90 1.78 2.65 1.78
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2
[78 2 86 1] [00 1 06 2]
1981 2 2002 4
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
Government Expenditure Parameter: 0.1112−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.2  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Government 
Expenditure (Cont’d) 
Japan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
30.01* 11.04 * 12.12 * 10.07 * 8.34 * 7.98 * 7.10 * 30.01* 30.01*
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
19.88 * 6.56 3.06 3.06 2.70 3.06
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2
[69 2 72 4] [77 1 80 2]
1972 1 1977 2
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
 
Government Expenditure Parameter: 0.1019  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Korea 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
8.83 25.29 * 16.87 * 12.81* 10.97 * 9.12 * 9.01* 25.29 * 32.43 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
23.88 * 23.59 * 2.93 2.93 2.93
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time      
1 2 3
[80 2 85 1] [83 4 90 3] [97 4 08 2]
1980 4 1987 1 1999 2
Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T T T
− − −
) ) )
  
Government Expenditure Parameter: 0.7408−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mexico 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
4.35 7.28 5.42 4.42 7.16 * 17.84 * 15.02 * 17.84 * 40.39 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
8.99 2.05 7.54 7.54 2.67 0.30
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time  No break    
  
Government Expenditure Parameter: 1.9778**  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.2  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Government 
Expenditure 
New Zealand 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
11.83 * * 22.16 * 8.56 * 15.68 * 14.98 * 11.92 * 14.35 * 22.16 * 36.95 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
11.01* 0.89 0.89 1.12 0.19
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time      
1 2
[85 2 92 2] [88 4 90 3]
1987 2 1990 1
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
 
Government Expenditure Parameter: 0.5383**  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The United Kingdom 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
81.42 * 27.90 * 22.76 * 17.54 * 14.20 * 12.40 * 10.97 * 81.42 * 81.42 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
8.98 8.98 6.93 6.93 2.10 1.31
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1
[79 2 82 1]
1980 2
Q Q
Q
T
−
)
  
Government Expenditure Parameter: 1.3660 *−  
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.3  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Real Oil 
Prices 
Australia 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
20.68 * 51.74 * 35.57 * 30.73 * 25.18 * 24.72 * 27.43 * 51.74 * 70.62 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
63.65 * 27.06 * 7.89 8.79 8.79
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time      
1 2 3
[69 3 71 4] [76 3 78 4] [79 1 83 2]
1971 2 1976 4 1981 4
Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T T T
− − −
) ) )
  
Oil Price Parameter: 0.0201*−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Canada 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
31.86 * 15.88 * 22.64 * 44.13 * 32.15 * 29.52 * 25.96 * 44.13 * 78.47 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
24.01* 23.46 * 11.80 * 2.86 2.86
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time      
1 2 3 4
[66 2 72 1] [77 4 81 3] [80 1 87 2] [93 3 98 1]
1971 4 1979 2 1984 2 1996 4
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q Q
T T T T
− − − −
) ) ) )
  
Oil Price Parameter: 0.0052−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Germany 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
7.26 10.47 * 32.53 * 27.71* 39.81* 36.16 * 27.28 * 39.81* 81.89 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
15.69 * 1.75 1.91 1.96 1.75 2.43
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2
[78 3 83 3] [87 4 95 1]
1979 3 1989 4
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
Oil Price Parameter: 0.0114 *−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.3  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Real Oil 
Prices (Cont’d) 
Japan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
12.98 ** 11.87 * 9.65 * 7.78 * 8.54 * 7.33 * 6.33 * 12.98 * 17.13 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
18.86 * 3.42 2.33 1.41 0.65
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time      
1 2
[68 3 73 4] [80 1 84 1]
1972 4 1980 2
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
Oil Price Parameter: 0.0066  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Korea 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
4.24 26.03 * 28.77 * 25.99 * 19.69 * 16.57 * 15.81* 28.77 * 46.23 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
43.44 * 6.85 10.13 4.58 7.92 0.01
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2
[81 1 85 3] [86 3 88 1]
1981 3 1987 1
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
Oil Price Parameter: 0.0391*−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mexico 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
4.74 5.62 6.03 4.76 4.98 8.38 * 7.48 * 8.37 19.25 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
5.76 5.08 1.74 1.97
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
− −
 
Break Time  No break    
  
Oil Price Parameter: 0.0642−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.3  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Real Oil 
Prices (Cont’d) 
New Zealand 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
24.61* 27.59 * 18.31* 110.29 * 20.85 * 39.07 * 37.23 * 110.29 * 196.14 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
2.78 2.78 4.66 2.35 6.61 4.52
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1
[86 3 91 1]
1986 4
Q Q
Q
T
−
)
 
Oil Price Parameter: 0.0264 **−  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The United Kingdom 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
25.21* 22.77 * 23.59 * 17.69 * 14.15 * 12.49 * 11.32 * 25.21* 36.42 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
20.49 * 7.94 7.94 5.11 0.95 0.95
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2
[65 2 71 1] [80 1 83 2]
1970 3 1980 2
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
Oil Price Parameter: 0.0182 *−  
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level  
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Table 3.4  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Fed Regimes 
Australia 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
8.51 5.29 9.83 * 9.89 * 9.08 * 7.68 * 6.90 * 9.89 ** 18.21*
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
a
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
9.88 * * 16.86 * 9.65 4.40 1.59 0.97
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2 3
[63 4 75 2] [82 1 90 2] [95 4 02 2]
1973 1 1983 4 1999 2
Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T T T
− − −
) ) )
  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Canada 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
8.78 13.86 * 9.91* 7.39 * 6.07 ** 5.68 * * 4.71** 13.86 * 17.77 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
a
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
7.25 3.67 2.23 1.08 1.84 0.63
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1
[90 4 08 2]
1999 1
Q Q
Q
T
−
)
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Germany 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
8.68 6.38 5.29 5.31 4.35 3.86 3.16 8.68 8.68
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
a a a
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
3.02 2.46 2.22 0.94 0.94 0.16
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1
[98 4 08 2]
2002 4
Q Q
Q
T
−
)
  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.4  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Fed Regimes 
(Cont’d) 
 
Japan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
2.65 2.30 2.71 2.73 3.31 3.07 2.61 3.31 6.95
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
3.58 5.83 5.83 5.83 1.19 0.58
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time  No Break    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Korea 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
1.31 12.54 * 9.22 * 9.25 * 10.22 * 8.57 * 7.61* 12.54 * * 20.50 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
24.19 * 7.52 7.52 4.17 0.75 0.64
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2
[80 2 08 2] [98 2 04 1]
1981 3 2000 2
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mexico 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
1.47 3.65 3.00 2.33 3.52 5.02 * * 4.47 ** 5.02 11.53
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
6.07 2.42 8.82 8.82 1.44 1.44
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time  No Break    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
New Zealand 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
8.94 4.89 4.25 6.11 7.61* 7.38 * 7.64 * 8.94 19.66 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
a a a
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
2.82 4.49 2.24 2.12 1.13 1.13
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1
[78 1 86 1]
1982 3
Q Q
Q
T
−
)
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.4  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Fed Regimes 
(Cont’d) 
The United Kingdom 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
3.90 3.52 6.90 * * 9.13 * 8.04 * 8.08 * 6.99 * 9.13 18.30 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
a
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
9.12 15.76 * 15.76 * 3.89 3.89 0.62
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
a  
Break Time      
1 2 3 4
[66 1 72 1] [68 3 74 2] [81 1 88 1] [85 2 92 1]
1969 1 1974 1 1981 2 1988 1
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q Q
T T T T
− − − −
) ) ) )
 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.5  Structural Breaks for Inflation 
Australia 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
11.43 * * 39.33 * 47.28 * 38.85 * 43.99 * 36.92 * 32.09 * 47.28 * 88.25 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
52.77 * 15.82 * 9.93 8.96 5.58
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
3
1972 4 [72 1 73 2]
1977 4 [76 1 80 4]
1990 4 [90 1 92 2]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
T
−
−
−
)
)
)
  
1
2
3
4
R
R
R
R
  
2.92% *
13.29% *
8.22% *
2.56% *
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Canada 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
9.29 * * 63.98 * 58.24 * 50.12 * 46.14 * 46.04 * 36.44 * 63.98 * 104.28 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
18.03 * 42.28 * 20.90 * 4.67
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
− −
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
3
4
1964 4 [62 3 67 1]
1972 2 [71 1 72 3]
1982 3 [82 2 84 3]
1991 1[89 2 92 2]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
T
T
−
−
−
−
)
)
)
)
  
1
2
3
4
5
R
R
R
R
R
  
1.60% *
3.69% *
9.54% *
4.67% *
1.96% *
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Germany 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
24.12 * 22.63 * 16.76 * 18.58 * 17.03 * 15.42 * 12.73 * 24.12 * 34.93 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
8.22 4.17 3.92 4.45 2.08 2.44
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1 1982 4 [79 3 85 2]Q Q QT −
)
  1
2
R
R
  
4.46% *
2.01% *
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.5  Structural Breaks for Inflation (Cont’d) 
Japan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
26.32 * 21.97 * 25.86 * 22.69 * 24.54 * 21.33 * 19.95 * 26.32 * 51.35 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
23.48 * 4.92 3.00
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
− − −
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
1981 2 [81 2 92 2]
1993 3 [91 2 96 4]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
−
−
)
)   
1
2
3
R
R
R
  
6.55% *
1.85% *
0.08%
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Korea 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
44.61* 32.47 * 25.25 * 24.54 * 21.40 * 17.83 * 14.89 * 44.61* 44.61*
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
11.75 * 11.75 * 2.42 2.42 2.17
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
3
1981 3 [81 2 83 2]
1987 1[83 1 88 1]
1998 1[97 1 02 2]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
T
−
−
−
)
)
)
  
1
2
3
4
R
R
R
R
  
19.52% *
2.76% *
6.52% *
2.88% *
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mexico 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
455.19 * 619.37 * 274.10 * 282.36 * 261.61* 218.60 * 185.42 * 619.37 * 794.07 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
22.37 * 17.07 * 5.04 1.28
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
− −
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
3
1988 1[87 4 88 2]
1999 1[99 1 07 4]
2001 2 [00 3 02 3]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
T
−
−
−
)
)
)
  
1
2
3
4
R
R
R
R
  
99.71% *
20.99% *
8.45% *
4.33% *
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.5  Structural Breaks for Inflation (Cont’d) 
New Zealand 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
45.27 * 34.12 * 41.56 * 24.93 * 21.10 * 18.98 * 20.36 * 45.27 * 64.16 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
19.03 * 7.51 7.51 7.51 4.06 6.60
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
1987 2 [87 1 92 1]
1990 4 [89 3 92 4]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
−
−
)
)   
1
2
3
R
R
R
  
7.38% *
1.91% *
0.34% *
−
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The United Kingdom 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
11.93 * * 19.91* 22.39 * 24.18 * 19.26 * 16.45 * 14.15 * 24.18 * 43.00 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
19.15 * 27.00 * 4.23 4.23 0.89
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time     Regime   Mean 
1
2
3
1969 4 [65 4 70 1]
1981 2 [80 4 88 4]
1991 2 [90 2 96 2]
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T
T
T
−
−
−
)
)
)
  
1
2
3
4
R
R
R
R
  
3.28% *
13.29% *
6.01% *
2.86% *
 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.6  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Inflation 
Australia 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
149.00 * 357.77 * 388.31* 337.50 * 272.2 * 239.48 * 204.57 * 388.31* 600.21*
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
193.51* 224.47 * 92.04 * 16.28 * 9.85 4.53
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2 3 4 5
[65 2 70 1] [76 1 77 2] [81 2 82 4] [91 2 91 4] [97 1 98 1]
1969 2 1976 4 1981 4 1991 3 1997 2
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q Q Q
T T T T T
− − − − −
) ) ) ) )
  
Inflation Parameter: -0.8677* 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Canada 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
8.04 37.08 * 44.72 * 32.31* 50.88 * 47.14 * 48.57 * 50.88 * 125.02 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
a
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
39.30 * 41.80 * 8.16 6.11 6.11 0.86
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2 3
[72 4 76 2] [91 2 96 1] [99 4 04 3]
1975 3 1992 1 2001 2
Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T T T
− − −
) ) )
 
Inflation Parameter: -0.2120* 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Germany 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
22.47 * 11.25 * 14.33 * 6.24 * * 15.31* 14.32 * 20.80 * 22.47 * 53.55 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
24.77 * 0.81 1.61 2.34 2.34 0.42
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2
[75 3 79 4] [95 2 03 3]
1979 3 1995 4
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
Inflation Parameter: -0.7165 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.6  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Inflation 
(Cont’d) 
Japan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
73.97 * 172.14 * 293.23 * 703.44 * 720.43 * 1327.88 * 1962.11* 1962.11* 5050.98 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
29.95 * 21.86 * 4.63 2.03 2.03 2.03
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2 3
[67 1 71 2] [79 3 86 1] [91 4 94 1]
1970 3 1984 3 1992 4
Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q
T T T
− − −
) ) )
  
Inflation Parameter: -0.9471* 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Korea 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
22.03 * 56.76 * 25.87 * 131.52 * 342.71* 296.44 * 250.98 * 342.71* 687.53 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
34.46 * 9.70 9.40 7.77 0.97
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time      
1 2
[81 1 83 2] [96 3 99 4]
1982 1 1998 3
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
 
Inflation Parameter: -0.9409* 
Mexico 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
40.27 * 141.57 * 57.31* 30.37 * 32.99 * 29.99 * 37.98 * 141.57 * 181.51*
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
46.60 * 2.20 2.37 0.95 2.20 2.20
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2
[89 4 91 2] [01 1 05 1]
1990 2 2001 2
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
Inflation Parameter: -0.5407* 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.6  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Inflation 
(Cont’d) 
New Zealand 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
16.78 * 49.93 * 79.45 * 63.51* 45.87 * 151.87 * 151.62 * 151.87 * 390.31*
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
90.90 * 8.65 8.22 8.22 8.22 0.35
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2
[82 3 85 4] [90 1 92 3]
1985 2 1991 2
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
Inflation Parameter: -0.9158 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The United Kingdom 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
13.47 * 62.12 * 38.20 * 34.89 * 30.37 * 28.49 * 24.37 * 62.12 * 79.64 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
83.67 * 18.18 * 12.39 * 0.80
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
− −
 
Break Time      
1 2 3 4
[63 3 69 4] [70 2 73 1] [92 2 95 1] [98 1 02 3]
1966 2 1972 4 1992 3 2001 1
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q Q
T T T T
− − − −
) ) ) )
 
Inflation Parameter: -0.9426* 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.7  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Inflation 
Regimes 
Australia 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
11.59 * * 16.85 * 14.41* 13.15 * 10.87 * 9.59 * 9.47 * 16.85 * 24.39 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
18.71* 9.14 4.50 2.76 0.55
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time      
1 2
[79 1 91 1] [97 2 01 4]
1983 4 1999 2
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Canada 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
9.26 * * 15.32 * 13.40 * 11.01* 9.61* 7.96 * 6.93 * 15.32 * 20.70 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
13.14 * 6.50 1.37 3.72 0.32 0.89
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time      
1 2
[78 1 97 3] [98 4 03 4]
1983 3 2001 1
Q Q Q Q
Q Q
T T
− −
) )
  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Germany 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
16.43 * 7.79 9.53 * 7.38 * 5.64 * * 4.78 4.15 16.43 * 16.43 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
2.82 1.02 0.87 0.64 0.02
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T
−
 
Break Time      
1
[00 4 08 2]
2002 4
Q Q
Q
T
−
)
  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.7  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Inflation 
Regimes (Cont’d) 
Japan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
15.18 * 8.96 * * 6.56 6.12 * * 5.22 5.00 * * 4.44 * * 15.18 * 15.18 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
4.31 4.17 4.17 2.50 1.52 0.80
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time     
1
[58 2 74 2]
1969 1
Q Q
Q
T
−
)
  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Korea 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
4.91 4.71 3.10 2.75 2.33 2.01 1.76 4.91 6.04
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
2.95 0.35 0.64 0.78 0.99 0.50
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time  No Break    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mexico 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
0.48 3.53 2.51 2.05 2.93 2.87 3.75 3.75 9.65
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
6.76 1.02 1.52 1.52 1.24 1.66
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time  No Break    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
New Zealand 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
5.31 3.31 4.23 7.46 * 8.69 * 9.16 * 7.65 * 9.16 20.74 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
2.86 6.92 1.61 2.38 4.53 0.20
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time  No Break    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
 168 
 
 
Table 3.7  Structural Breaks of Real Interest Rates Controlled for Inflation 
Regimes (Cont’d) 
The United Kingdom 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) max max
3.08 1.79 4.16 8.79 * 7.58 * 7.47 * 5.76 * 8.79 16.92 *
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF UD WDT T T T T T T
(2 | 1) (3 | 2) (4 | 3) (5 | 4) (6 | 5) (7 | 6)
6.74 7.03 7.03 3.04 0.49 0.72
SupF SupF SupF SupF SupF SupFT T T T T T  
Break Time  No Break    
* , ** and a denote 1% , 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.8  J-Test: Fed Regime vs. Inflation Regime 
Australia 
H0: Fed Regime  4.4719*   H0: Inflation Regime  3.9200* 
H1: Inflation Regime     H1: Fed Regime 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Canada 
H0: Fed Regime  4.2445*   H0: Inflation Regime  3.2789* 
H1: Inflation Regime     H1: Fed Regime 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Germany 
H0: Fed Regime  0.0344   H0: Inflation Regime  3.9333* 
H1: Inflation Regime     H1: Fed Regime 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Japan 
H0: Fed Regime  1.6614
a   H0: Inflation Regime  6.6405* 
H1: Inflation Regime     H1: Fed Regime 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Korea 
H0: Fed Regime  3.4436*   H0: Inflation Regime  0.5411 
H1: Inflation Regime     H1: Fed Regime 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mexico 
H0: Fed Regime  4.8157*   H0: Inflation Regime  -1.8289
a 
H1: Inflation Regime     H1: Fed Regime 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
New Zealand 
H0: Fed Regime  0.9761   H0: Inflation Regime  2.1429** 
H1: Inflation Regime     H1: Fed Regime 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The United Kingdom 
H0: Fed Regime  3.6400*   H0: Inflation Regime  2.5809* 
H1: Inflation Regime     H1: Fed Regime 
*, ** and a denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
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Table 3.9  Summary of Factors Explaining Breaks in Real Interest Rates 
Country     Break Time of Real Interest Rates 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Australia  71Q1  76Q4  82Q4    99Q2 
    π   Fed / π        OP 
 
Canada  71Q1     81Q1    99Q2 
   G / Fed /π      Fed    
 
Germany        81Q1    02Q4 
         Fed /π     
 
Japan  72Q4     80Q2 
   Fed      Fed /π 
 
Korea        81Q3  87Q1 00Q2 
          π   Fed / π OP / π 
 
Mexico           88Q4 
            G / OP / Fed /π 
 
New Zealand          86Q4 99Q4 
            π  OP / Fed /π 
 
The United 68Q1  73Q3  81Q2    02Q1 
Kingdom  G /π   G / OP /π   π     G / OP / Fed /π 
G, π, OP and Fed denote government expenditures, inflation regimes, real oil prices and US Fed regimes 
respectively; the reported break times for real interest rates are obtained from the BP method 
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Table 3.10  Unit Root Tests 
      ADF      KPSS       LP 
Country  taxi   π    taxi   π    taxi   π  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Australia  -1.40  -2.41   0.42  0.36   -5.56  -5.47 
Canada  -2.40  -2.06   0.37  0.37   -4.94  -5.68 
Germany  -2.24  -2.12   0.54  0.47   -4.90  -3.92 
Japan  -0.90  -2.76   1.59  0.88   -6.30  -7.12 
Korea  -0.78  -3.82   1.26  0.85   -6.12  -6.65 
Mexico  -1.90  -2.91   0.82  0.76   -9.65  -15.80 
New Zealand -2.11  -2.95   0.73  0.99   -6.20  -8.68 
Switzerland -2.22  -2.79   0.64  0.59   -6.46  -4.40 
UK   -2.57  -2.87   0.38  0.38   -6.08  -5.69 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Critical Value -3.46 (1%)   0.74 (1%)    -6.94 (1%) 
   -2.88 (5%)   0.46 (5%)    -6.24 (5%) 
   -2.57 (10%)   0.35 (10%)   -5.96 (10%) 
LP denotes the Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) unit root test allowing for two breaks in intercept; the null hypothesis 
is the unit root process 
itax, and [represent the tax-adjusted nominal interest rate and inflation 
 
Table 3.11  Multivariate Ljung-Box Test (VAR Model) 
Country   4Q   8Q   12Q   
2
4Q   
2
8Q   
2
12Q  
Australia   4.90  20.46  39.27  79.51* 117.21* 152.97* 
Canada   4.57  16.26  29.54  101.47* 125.04* 133.93* 
Germany   3.40  11.40  24.29  41.28* 60.01* 72.55* 
Japan    4.99  17.93  38.29  25.12* 27.07  30.28 
Korea   4.28  24.85  50.47  49.24* 95.24* 124.62* 
Mexico   6.16  23.71  34.23  30.50* 38.44  44.82 
New Zealand  7.19  24.78  42.13  23.19** 114.20* 125.95* 
Switzerland  5.31  18.38  22.14  46.84* 54.00* 68.21* 
The United Kingdom 3.08  18.50  37.52  48.91* 135.03* 172.91* 
* , ** denote 1% and 5% significance level ; standardized residuals and their squares are used for the tests 
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Table 3.12  Estimation Results of VAR-GARCH Models 
 
    Australia  Canada  Germany  
    \ itax \ itax \ itax 
\t-1 0.2373* 0.0110 0.3844* 0.0380 0.2455* 0.0682* 
\t-2 0.1964* 0.0049 0.0516 0.0088 -0.0924 -0.0123 
\t-3 0.0707 0.0158 0.0792 0.0184 -0.0018 0.0183 
\t-4 0.2249* -0.0126 0.3574 0.0191 0.5590* -0.0144 
\t-5     -0.1693 -0.0522* 
\t-6       
\t-7       
\t-8       
\t-9       
itax,t-1 1.8355* 1.0881* 0.2779 1.2634* 0.5559 1.3583* 
itax,t-2 -0.7134 -0.1398 -0.2938 -0.4480* 0.5528 -0.3006 
itax,t-3 -0.4342 0.1225 0.3086 0.0691 -1.0667 -0.1473 
itax,t-4 -0.4884 -0.1294 -0.2656 0.0179 -0.1025 0.002 
itax,t-5     0.3234 0.0216 
itax,t-6       
itax,t-7       
itax,t-8       
itax,t-9       
] 0.0034 0.0018* 0.0042 0.0011 0.0018 0.0018** 
      
c11 c12 0.0139* 0.0003 0.0176* 0.0005 0.0101* 0.0002 
0 c22 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      
a11 a12 0.4270* 0.0121 -0.4407* -0.0995* 0.5875* 0.0529* 
a21 a22 -1.7973* 0.3967 0.8962* 0.5738* -0.3864 0.3875* 
b11 b12 0.7118* -0.0078 0.3881 -0.0361 -0.5486* -0.0288** 
b21 b22 0.6832* 0.9048* -0.294 0.8365* 0.1131 0.8814* 
*, ** denote 1% and 5% significance levels 
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Table 3.12  Estimation Results of VAR-GARCH Models (Cont’d) 
 
    Japan  Korea  Mexico  
    \ itax \ itax \ itax 
\t-1 -0.0330 0.0024 0.1921* 0.0062 0.3523 -0.0725 
\t-2 0.1978* -0.0002 -0.002 0.0125 0.1243 0.1004 
\t-3 0.0000 -0.0035 0.1878 -0.0101 0.2557 0.0027 
\t-4 0.4638* 0.0050 0.1701 -0.0031 -0.1251 0.1147 
\t-5 -0.0413 -0.0085** 0.0504 -0.0009 0.1225 -0.0348 
\t-6  -0.0859 -0.0016 -0.4166 -0.0209 
\t-7  -0.1335 -0.0167 0.2514 -0.0036 
\t-8    0.0804 0.0779 
\t-9      
itax,t-1 0.9514 1.2081* 1.3928* 1.1308* 1.0365 1.0525* 
itax,t-2 0.2106 -0.1405 -0.8080 -0.0733 -1.5061 -0.7035 
itax,t-3 1.7389 0.0536 0.7677 -0.2172 0.7917 0.6719 
itax,t-4 -3.6542 -0.0639 -0.8276 0.2603 -0.2655 -0.5201 
itax,t-5 1.1247 -0.0595 0.2830 -0.1341 -0.0199 0.3063 
itax,t-6  0.5699 0.1605 0.3827 -0.1600 
itax,t-7  -0.9430 -0.1060 -0.1047 0.1268 
itax,t-8    -0.2124 -0.0991 
itax,t-9      
] -0.0005 0.0001 0.0042 -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0132 
     
c11 c12 0.0052 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0031 -0.0013 
0 c22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     
a11 a12 0.5002* 0.0009 0.2576* 0.0340* 0.8102* 0.1265* 
a21 a22 0.7849** 0.1288* 0.9731 1.5915* 1.8784* 1.4356* 
b11 b12 0.8734* 0.0020* 0.9240* -0.0226* 0.5463* -0.1427* 
b21 b22 -0.1193 0.9734* -1.6523* 0.2486* -0.7330* 0.4825* 
*, ** denote 1% and 5% significance levels 
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Table 3.12  Estimation Results of VAR-GARCH Models (Cont’d) 
 
    New Zealand  Switzerland  The United Kingdom 
    \ itax \ itax \ itax 
\t-1 0.4924* 0.0621* 0.1890 0.0090 0.3002* 0.0226 
\t-2 0.0519 -0.0244 0.1336 -0.0079 0.0846 -0.0163 
\t-3 0.1366 0.0174 -0.1800 0.0114 -0.0611 -0.0038 
\t-4 0.1879 -0.0117 0.5478* 0.0188 0.4695* -0.0042 
\t-5 -0.0632 -0.0394 -0.2806 -0.0009 -0.2262 -0.0024 
\t-6     0.026 0.0295* 
\t-7     -0.0018 0.0073 
\t-8     0.2694 -0.0049 
    -0.0571 -0.0022 
itax,t-1 1.5987 1.1948* -0.5334 1.3825* 1.5282* 1.2587* 
itax,t-2 -0.7135 -0.3306 2.2512** -0.2237 -1.2966 -0.3398 
itax,t-3 -1.5386 0.0412 -0.4501 -0.0905 0.2766 -0.0019 
itax,t-4 0.7603 -0.1366 -0.9596 -0.3683 -0.6699 0.1584 
itax,t-5 0.0976 0.1863** 0.1172 0.2318** -0.2307 -0.2374 
itax,t-6     0.9163 0.124 
itax,t-7     0.3227 -0.1193 
itax,t-8     -1.726 0.0643 
    0.8399 0.0228 
] -0.0006 0.0016 0.0022 0.0004 0.0099 0.0016 
         
c11 c12 0.0071* 0.0003* 0.0039* 0.0002 0.0019 0.0003 
0 c22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     
a11 a12 0.1959* -0.0500* 0.3751* 0.0066 0.4231* 0.007 
a21 a22 2.7024* 0.7390* 0.2801 0.3354* -1.4833* -0.0958* 
b11 b12 0.8619* 0.0085* 0.8889* -0.0077* 0.8599* -0.0273* 
b21 b22 -1.9768* 0.6766* -0.0138 0.9334* 0.9556* 1.0115* 
*, ** denote 1% and 5% significance levels 
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Table 3.13  Multivariate Ljung-Box Test (VAR-GARCH Model) 
Country    4Q   8Q   12Q    
2
4Q   
2
8Q   
2
12Q  
Australia    10.09  24.46  35.93   11.02  27.81  38.55 
Canada    5.90  15.38  31.21   16.50  32.67  45.22 
Germany    10.03  19.68  35.65   14.73  28.53  40.09 
Japan     14.46  28.64  52.54   6.12  17.29  24.63 
Korea    14.21  36.13  50.33   16.06  33.74  51.98 
Mexico    16.95  29.53  31.15   19.56  33.87  50.52 
New Zealand   5.58  17.44  34.52   5.66  28.91  37.37 
Switzerland   14.18  35.24  42.98   13.13  24.16  48.14 
The United Kingdom  6.41  15.81  25.82   8.56  17.53  26.28 
* , ** denote 1% and 5% significance level ; standardized residuals and their squares are used for the tests 
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Table 3.14  Cointegration Tests 
Country  Number of Cointegrating Eqt  traceλ   maxλ    πβ  
Australia   r = 0     17.14   12.86   - 
    r ≤ 1     4.28   4.28   - 
Canada   r = 0     19.55   14.00   - 
    r ≤ 1     5.55   5.55   - 
Germany   r = 0     16.92   10.31   - 
    r ≤ 1     6.61   6.61   - 
Japan    r = 0     17.51   15.41   - 
    r ≤ 1     2.10   2.10   - 
Korea    r = 0     18.54   16.40   - 
    r ≤ 1     2.15   2.15   - 
Mexico   r = 0     22.78**  20.02**  0.7588* 
    r ≤ 1     2.76   2.76   - 
New Zealand  r = 0     10.47   6.68   - 
    r ≤ 1     3.79   3.79   - 
Switzerland   r = 0     18.80   14.57   - 
    r ≤ 1     4.23   4.23   - 
The United Kingdom r = 0     17.04   11.50   - 
    r ≤ 1     5.54   5.54   - 
* , ** denote 1% and 5% significance level 
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